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ABSTRACT 
                                                                                                                                                 
This study will examine and surveys Nigeria’s experience in fashioning out,  vital reform in her Civil Service, 
over the years, with the aim of re-inventing the processes of governance to meet the ever- increasing challenges 
in the business of governance. Further, it will look at the progress made over the years, the notable failures, 
successes, and likely solutions to some of the identified problems. Also, this work will highlight some of the 
challenges that have limited the success of the reforms. 
 
This work will also look at reforms in Nigeria, with respect to the New Public Management, and how the civil 
service in Nigeria, can modernize, using the ideas of the New Public Management. This study will show that 
reforms to date have been insufficiently ambitious in scope to bring about the degree of change that is needed. 
Meaningful change will require more forceful, sincere, pro- active and futuristic reforms. It will also show the 
need for accountability, transparency, good ethics and integrity in revitalizing the public service.  More 
emphasis should be placed on devising a coherent, overarching strategy for civil service reform and detailing the 
set of tactics by which these strategic goals will be achieved. 
 
 This study, will examine corruption, both its many definitions and scope. The causes of corruption in the civil 
service, the issues that gave rise to widespread corruption, over the years in the Nigerian civil service. The 
various measures at tackling its menace will also be highlighted. There will also be some analysis on the factors 
promoting corruption. The synergy between prevention of corruption in the Nigerian bureaucracy and the 
expected transformation in the civil service, for the overall development of the Nation (Nigeria). Lastly, the 
centrality or incumbency of adequate incentives as a veritable means in revitalizing the civil service will also 
form a part of this study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria, with its constituent thirty- six state-units, occupies a land of 
over 356,669 square miles or 923,773 square kilometers within the tropical region. Latest 
estimates put the population at about 140 million which is increasing at a growth rate of about 
2.5 percent. There are over 250 ethnic groups, each of which has its own customs, traditions, 
and language. These diversities are reinforced by the location of the major ethnic groups 
within distinct geographical regions and the preponderance of two rival religions: Islam in the 
north and Christianity in the south. These features provide the rationale for Nigeria’s 
adoption of a federal system. At the same time, they have greatly complicated the political 
and administrative evolution of the Nigerian state. (Adamolekun 1978:92).    
 
1.1. Historical background 
 
The subsistence economy of the pre colonial era was significantly transformed under colonial 
rule into a dependent extension of the worldwide capitalist economic system of the British 
rulers. The emphasis was on the production and export of tropical raw materials (notably 
cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, and palm oil) within Nigeria and on the importation of 
manufactured goods and a limited range of luxury items into Nigeria from Britain. This 
economic structure was maintained after independence with minor modifications until the 
advent of huge revenues from petroleum in the 1970s made possible giant strides in the 
provision of infrastructures and the expansion of activities in the industrial, manufacturing, 
and trading sectors. At about the same time, a conscious effort was made to increase the share 
of indigenous entrepreneurs in economic activities (the indigenization decrees of the 1970s), 
and it was formally asserted that the Nigerian state would control the ``commanding heights`` 
of the economy. 
 
A notable consequence of the economic policies of the 1970s was a huge increase in the 
scope of public sector organizations, especially the category that is commonly referred to as 
public enterprises or parastatals. Toward the end of the 1970s, it was clear that ``easy`` 
money from petroleum had led to a neglect of the agricultural sector.  From a position of near 
sufficiency in food production before the oil boom, the country had become heavily 
dependent on food imports. To worsen matters, the international oil market became unstable, 
and the heavy reliance on oil revenue for between 75 and 90 percent of total foreign exchange 
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earnings meant that the country’s economic position became precarious. At independence in 
1960, it was widely accepted that the government and administration of Nigeria would follow 
the Westminster-Whitehall arrangement in Britain. For various reasons, the experiment 
collapsed in January 1966, and it was succeeded by a military government that remained in 
power (with four different heads of state) until September 1979. 
 
After the return of civilian rule in October 1979, a presidential system of government was 
adopted as a better alternative to the parliamentary system of government. In practice, the 
expectations placed in the new system were not fulfilled, and civilian rule collapsed once 
again after only fifty-one months. The country had passed through four and half years of 
army rule by mid- 1988 after the military came a second time. The actual changes of 
government (each time without respect for the established rules), together with the political 
crises, add up to a very unstable landscape within which the public administration system has 
had to evolve since independence (Olusanya 1975: 88). 
 
This research surveys Nigeria’s experience in civil service reform and assesses the progress 
made. Civil service reform as practiced in its public administration has mainly focused on 
two separate but related dimensions. One deals with the shorter-term, emergency steps to 
reform public pay and employment policies. These reforms usually centre on measures to 
contain the cost and size of the civil service, mostly in the context of structural adjustment 
programs. 
 
The other reform dimension deals with longer- range civil service strengthening efforts, some 
of which may support several of the nearer- term cost containment measures, but most of 
which are directed toward ongoing, sustained management improvements.  Many of these 
longer-term reforms have been included in projects- either those that stand alone as 
``development management`` operations or those that constitute direct institutional support 
for specific actions taken in structural adjustment processes. 
 
I agree with a number of scholars who have noted the point that there exists no clear 
articulation of the philosophical premise underpinning Nigerian public administration 
(Adamolekun 1978: 90; 1985: 334). What exists in the minds of students and practitioners of 
Nigerian public administration is a conception of British or American public service and how 
they could best be imitated.  In this regard, this was no different from British colonials who 
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presumed that African development must be patterned along the lines of Western political 
philosophy. (Beckman 1982: 20-23). 
 
This fault is not wholly that of students or practitioners of public administration, as public 
administration, is inextricably bound to its political environment. Nevertheless, there are at 
least two aspects of the Nigerian public sector which have not been properly articulated.  
First, the lessons that can be learned from Africa’s indigenous (non- official) institutions for 
the reform or reconstitution of the official ones have been sadly neglected even though they 
constitute a part of the Nigerian public realm.  Not even at the level of local government has 
this been regarded as a priority and only recently has research into Africa’s local institutions 
been phrased along these lines (Magid 1976: 12; Hyden & Bratton 1993: 127-164; Olowo 
1989: 18). 
 
Otherwise, the emphasis to-date in the reform of central and local institutions has been 
confined to tinkering with the structures inherited from colonial rule to the neglect of those 
outside the formal public sector and the values associated with the public sector in such non-
official organizations. The  poor integration of the structures and values in these two types of 
institutions is held as responsible for the widespread existence of polynormativism in African 
public services and the idea of  the two publics—a `public` (non-official)  public and  a 
`private` (official) public and the political/ bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption 
associated with world- view (Kasfir 1969:21; Ekeh & Osaghae 1988:86). 
 
A second and more important problem of conception is the articulation of the implications of 
Nigeria’s political and economic philosophies, if not ideologies.  For instance, the idea of a 
mixed economy has been defined so loosely that it can accommodate socialism (as the 
political Bureau strongly recommended) and capitalism to which many of Nigeria’s 
administrations had committed themselves. The administrative  implications of Nigeria’s 
economic liberalism is yet to be fully articulated beyond the agenda  set generally for all 
African countries by the World Bank (1993). Similarly, in terms of models of political 
institutions, David Murray has reminded us that the American presidential model with which 
we have become enamored since 1979 actually has two political/ administrative proto-types: 
the `overhead democracy` model which is the theoretical `presidential` model and the real, 
but `radically` different `democratic administration` model which is closer to the reality 
(Murray 1970: 229-231; Ostrom 1993: 125-130). Leonard (1989: 12) went on to suggest that 
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there are three models of public administration in the United States of America, each 
consistent with the political models of democracy held by Alexander Hamilton, Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison, the latter being an integration of the first two. Unfortunately, 
as the 1988 civil service reforms demonstrated too readily, the preference of policy advisors 
and politicians is for the overhead democracy model, when in reality the challenge before a 
country with an underdeveloped political class and a highly federal society should dictate that 
we explore the opportunities in the democratic administration model with competing power 
groups involved in administration. For instance, in accordance with the logic of the overhead 
democracy model, awesome powers (of financial and manpower resources management) 
have now been concentrated in the hands of ministers, commissioners and chairmen of local 
governments whereas the arrangements for enforcing accountable performance are at best 
uncertain. Yet, the Nigerian political system has hardly reached a stage where one can vouch 
for the expertise, skill and integrity of those who rise to become ministers (Olowo 1989: 20).  
 
At independence, Nigeria had a bureaucratic administration that emphasized the sovereignty 
of politics rather than the supremacy of administration (Kempe 1983: 49). This was 
accomplished partially through the stressing of political dominance. The saliency of political 
dominance over bureaucratic values created a style of administrative behavior that is highly 
politicized despite the formal acceptance of a career system of administration based on a high 
degree of professionalism. The politico- administrative elite actively participated in the 
transplantation of the Weberian bureaucratic model to Nigeria, like in some other African 
countries. According to the Weberian conception, the salient features of a career civil service 
and the expected benefits are summarized thus: Recruitment and promotion  based on merit, 
security of tenure, fixed decent salary; being property-less ; political neutrality .While, the 
expected benefits are: Efficient administration and high productivity; continuity and 
predictability in the conduct of government business; loyalty to the incumbent political 
executive; smooth political leadership succession; honesty and high productivity; fairness and 
impartiality to all citizens, including consistency and equity of service, continuity and 
predictability in the conduct of government business, political executive fairness respectively 
(Adamolekun 1985:41).  
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1.2. Background of the Study 
 
The objective of both the Nigerian Nationalist leaders and the British colonial administration 
officers was to transplant the Whitehall- Westminster politico- administrative arrangements 
in to Nigeria in the 1950s. The key features of the administrative arrangements included: The 
idea of a career civil service adopted, and public service commissions established (and 
guaranteed in the country’s 1954 constitution) to manage and protect the service.  It was 
expected that, as was the case in Britain, recruitment would be through open competition and 
the progress of each officer would be determined on the basis of performance and seniority. 
In other words, the civil service was to function on the basis of the merit principle. 
 
A second important feature of the career civil service was that its members (especially those 
in the senior posts) were expected to observe the norms of anonymity, impartiality, and 
political neutrality. This requirement would enable them to serve successive teams of 
political leaders with loyalty. It was also expected that, as in Britain, Nigerian ministers 
would bear total responsibility for the conduct of government business (the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility). Although the civil servants were to assist in policy formulation 
and to execute settled policies, they were to be named neither for praise nor for blame; praise 
and blame were to be reserved for the ministers in all circumstances (Olowo 2002: 76).  
 
Next, the actual structure of the machinery of government was organized along the same lines 
as the British government administration. Thus, there were ministries and departments of 
government which were placed directly under ministers. To accomplish this arrangement, it 
was necessary to reorganize the departments of the colonial administration secretariat which 
were headed by British officers. Furthermore, the aspects of government business that were 
organized outside the central machinery of government were entrusted to two British- 
inspired institutions: local governments and public or statutory corporations. Although 
Nigeria had a system of local governance prior to the 1950s, the new local governments were 
conceived as instruments for promoting local democracy and ensuring the effective 
administration of local affairs. 
 
The public corporations were formally constituted outside the ministries and departments 
under ministers with a view to allow them to function with some degree of autonomy. A final 
feature of the Nigerian public administration system of the 1950s was the federal structure. 
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Both the nationalist leaders and the British colonial rulers agreed that the peculiarities of the 
Nigerian milieu called for a federal administration. From 1954 onward, the Nigerian federal 
administration system consisted of one central or federal government and three regional 
governments. The key features of the Nigerian public administration of the 1950s were 
largely inspired by the British (Ayo 1995: 55-60). 
 
For a country whose political institutions drew heavily from Britain, it is possible in one 
breath to say that the study of Nigerian public administration has come a long way. Kirk- 
Green (1997: 258) contends that it was African decolonization that made public 
administration respectable in Britain, a country which always prided itself in producing top-
rate administrators from amateur gentlemen with little or no formal training in public 
administration. 
 
1.3. Main Questions and Objectives of the Research   
 
Nigeria is one of the largest countries in Africa. Also, it has the largest population in the 
African continent. Based on these facts, it is not out of place, to expect it, to have a 
qualitative Public Service, given its enormous human and material resources. Further, its 
citizens have and are still contributing to the development of many countries both in Africa 
and other parts of the World. The impacts of her citizens, is seen in many fields of human 
endeavor, ranging from; commerce, entertainment, peace keeping operations, sports, religion, 
justice, education, administration, and some others. 
 
The main goal of this study is to find out what are the main reasons for the need of a civil 
service reforms in Nigeria? This question will only be answered after five other questions 
get their answers: 
• What has happened to the Civil Service that produced many of the quality 
administrative personnel, who have over the years been of great value to both Nigeria 
and other countries?  
• Does the Nigerian Government have the institutional capacity necessary for the 
success of the Civil Service reforms? 
• To what extent has the Government pursued Civil Service Reforms in the light of the 
emerging Global Paradigm Shift? 
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• Have the various reforms in the Civil Service impacted negatively or positively on the 
performance of the Civil Service? 
• How far and how well, have civil service reforms been successful in reducing 
corruption to the barest level in the Public Service?  
 
From the above stated-questions, the Objectives of this Study, is to see how far the Civil 
Service has been reformed. Also, to highlight some of the challenges that had faced it. 
Another objective is to contribute to what had been written on the Nigerian Public Service, 
with the aim of making the Civil Service in Nigeria, a role model to others both in Africa and 
outside.  
 
1.4. Methodology  
 
The conceptual framework of this study is the assessment and evaluation of the global issues 
in public service reforms, using Nigeria mainly, as an example of a nation in search of 
appropriate bureaucracy to meet the needs of a growing population and the challenges of 
rapid change. This work will also highlight the obstacles in the way of the Public Service 
with the aim of recommending some innovative ideas, with which the Public Sector, can be 
reformed to perform at optimum level of efficiency and professionalism.   
 
Principally, the  research  design for this study, is the  careful analysis , based on the literature  
on the  topic, and  personal experiences as a Nigerian, to analyze and synchronize,  the  
various changes  of the Civil service in Nigeria. The research process will be conducted, 
using the observation method, and a critical elucidation on materials that deals academically 
on the public service in Nigeria, both past and present and even for the future. The research 
will also be tailored towards the analysis of the variables that may give one a guide and an 
insight into the workings of the civil service, and what make up the components of the civil 
service in Nigeria. 
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2. NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AS AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK.  
 
2.1. Ideas of NPM 
 
With the World becoming more and more of a global village, and many countries, like 
Nigeria, facing increasing challenges in their Public Sector, that requires solutions. The 
Nigerian government needs organizational restructuring as an attempt to improve the 
performance of the civil service, by improving the quality of service delivery (Hood 1991: 
50). 
 
The Nigerian Civil Service, like some others in the developing regions, is in dire need for a 
panacea to the ills of the Public Sector. With the emergence of the New Public Management, 
a paradigm shift in public administration was witnessed. The NPM is a dynamic approach 
adopted by governments to restructure their bureaucracies supposedly in order to better 
provide services to the citizens. This refers to a combination of modern ideas and practices 
that seek, at its core, the use of private sector and business approaches in the Public Sector. 
The major thrust in applying its ideas has been the use of market mechanisms and 
terminology, in which the relationships between public agencies and their customers is 
understood as involving transactions similar to those that occur in the market place.  
According to Ketti (2000: 98), “painted with the broadest brush, these reforms sought to 
replace the traditional rule-based, authority processes with market-based, competition- driven 
tactics”. 
 
The NPM theory advocates fewer public resources, more technological reliance, fewer 
government expenditure and more private sector involvement, all leading to performance 
targets, that can better serve those utilizing the services- the clients.  In essence, NPM aims to 
achieve more results, with fewer resources, which was previously, not the case. It also aims at 
streamlining the bureaucracy (McLellan 1997:8). Pal (2001: 12) argues there are key 
principles of the theory that can be often noted in its application. 
 
First, NPM advocates a departure from traditional bureaucratic structures; it views the 
administration side of government as stiff, cumbersome and rules oriented. It also emphasizes 
clear performance outcomes; it places a higher premium on quantitative results over 
qualitative conclusions. NPM seeks to create hybrid bureaucracies (downsize public service, 
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create arms length agencies). The NPM has been elevated into a global model and often used 
as a dominant yardstick to shape new research on public administration. In this regard, 
Argyriades (2006: 281) identifies two crucial features of NPM: “its scientific pretensions and 
its global ambitions”. 
 
However, the NPM has its flaws, one of which is its disjointed framework, and the original 
public management model of NPM does not appear to have had a coherent analytical frame 
work. For example, when Hood (1991: 50) first elaborated the NPM framework, he reviewed 
seven features of public sector reform that he considered the “doctrinal components” of NPM 
without explaining their mutual connection and taxonomic order. Despite its flaws, the 
impact of the NPM is still visible in the legacy of practical reforms- especially due to the lag 
in transferring administrative knowledge and techniques from the developed regions to 
developing regions, as some countries in Africa, are still in the process of pursuing its 
remaining elements (Dunleavy et al 2006: 467). 
 
In order to give a competitive and quality service, the aim of the Public Service is shifting 
from administration to production. This implies that, the result of service delivery must be 
measurable and analyzable. Unlike earlier reforms, especially in the Nigerian Civil Service, 
that were aimed at national development, current reforms are aimed at cost reduction and 
refocusing of Public Sector activities on service delivery and the whole economy 
(Therkildsen 2001: 62).  
 
According to Wescott (1999:145), African governments need a strategic framework for the 
improvement of their Public’s Service performance. He is also of the view, that donor 
agencies should appreciate the political sensitivity and limited administrative capacities of 
these countries and should accordingly, help to facilitate the latter. He believes that linking 
reforms to structural adjustment programs, not only limit the effectiveness of the aid donors, 
but also reduces the empowerment the affected governments need to design and carry out the 
necessary administrative reforms.  
 
New Public Management reforms, seek to remodel the relations between states, markets and 
societies by giving prominence to market forces, managerial efficiency and accountable 
government. In post-independence Nigeria, there have been high budget deficits, spiraling 
inflation rates, negative growth, rent-seeking behavior and civil conflicts. In order to stabilize 
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the crisis and foster economic growth, market and managerial reforms are to be promoted in 
both the private economy and the state sector. The approach adopted for the public sector has 
three main elements: The first element is on the need to reduce the size of the state. This is to 
be pursued through expenditure controls- withdrawing subsidies from basic goods and 
services, reducing the number of civil service staff, and privatizing government businesses 
(White & Bhatia 1998: 68). 
 
The second element of the approach deals with a redefinition of the role of the state: it is to 
be stripped of its traditions of universalism in service provision by encouraging the private 
and voluntary sectors to play active roles. Through competitive bidding, the state is to 
contract out its activities to private sector institutions (Larbi 1999: 88). 
 
The third element of the approach, deals with the issue of efficiency. The goal is to make the 
public sector operate like modern business enterprises. Business management methods to be 
utilized in changing the state’s administrative culture include decentralization of management 
systems through conversion of large civil service bureaucracies into executive agencies. 
Under such arrangements, managers, who are on fixed- term contracts, enjoy considerable 
flexibility in allocating resources, as well as in hiring and firing of staff. Decentralized 
management also means decentralized budgets, underpinned by an array of performance and 
output indicators, for which managers are held responsible (Ferlie et al 1996: 84-86). 
 
The New Public Management system is quite transparent, more consultative, and more result 
oriented. The NPM entails a widespread adoption of private sector management systems and 
techniques. Re-conception of central agency control and pervasive moves towards devolution 
of power to line managers, giving them greater flexibility in managing resources and staffing 
policies. In the NPM system, there is the demanding, measuring and rewarding both 
organizational and individual performance; recognizing the importance of providing the 
human and technological resources that managers need; a willingness and open-mindedness 
in the partnership between the public sector and the private sector. 
 
Some Scholars are of the opinion that the NPM.  Is not really new, having been in the fore-
front of public management discourse for over three decades (Argyriades 2002: 95). They 
also opined that the NPM had to some extent undermined core public sector values 
(Farazmand 2002: 355). 
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Table 1. NPM Reforms Compared with Traditional Public Service Administration (Joaquim 
2001: 918, on the basis of Hood 1991). 
 
Elements Traditional Administration New Public Management 
 
Government Organization Services provided on a uniform 
basis as a single aggregated 
unit 
Breakup of traditional 
structures into quasi- 
autonomous units 
Control of Public 
Organizations 
Control from the Headquarters 
through the hierarchy of 
unbroken supervision and 
checks  and balances 
Hands-on professional 
management with clear 
statement of goals and 
performance management 
Control of output measures Control on inputs and 
procedures 
Stress results and output 
control rather than 
procedures 
Management Practices Standard established 
procedures throughout the 
Service 
Using Private sector 
management style. 
Discipline in resources use Due process and  political  
entitlements 
Check resources demands 
and ‘do more with less’ 
 
The NPM is quite futuristic and innovative. As can be observe in the table, it splits traditional 
structures into semi- autonomous units for better efficiency. It is a result-driven approach and 
place less emphasis on procedures. Its principles are aimed at achieving much with little. Its 
theory is more of the private sector approach in administering organizations. 
 
As shown in the table above, the NPM reforms are more or less the opposite of the 
Traditional administration. While the NPM is based on pro active and somewhat hybrid 
approach in its operations, the Traditional administration, is more of the status quo. The NPM 
is based on control of public organization through supervision, the Traditional administration 
controls through unbroken hierarchies of checks and balances. The NPM is management 
based in practices, while the Traditional administration is operated on a laid down standard 
procedure(s). The NPM stresses discipline in the use of resources; the Traditional 
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administration is based on Due process and political entitlements. The NPM is premised on 
output measures, efficiency and effectiveness and results, the Traditional administration is 
based on control on inputs and procedures. 
 
Table 2: Old Public Administration “chestnuts” Compared with NPM Doctrines (Oyeyinka 
2006: 50, on the basis of Peters 1996 and Olowo 2002). 
                                   
Old Public Administration New Public Management 
A Political Civil Service Political and Accountable Management 
Hierarchy and Rules 
 
Markets are superior to markets, emphasis on 
contracts, not rules. 
Permanence and Stability Contractual Management 
 
Institutionalized Civil Service Only small policy and strategic center required 
Internal Regulation Internal regulation only for the rump of the 
Service not privatized nor decentralized. 
Equality of Outcome Differential Outcomes. 
 
The old public administration is characterized by strict hierarchy; delimited “jurisdictions” 
and resources are assigned from the top to officials and offices. There is a high level of 
permanence and stability and some form of predictability. Officials are selected by their 
superiors, not elected. Promotion is by “next in line” and not merit, more often than not, 
salary relate to status, not to performance. There is a high level if internal regulation and jobs 
are almost for life. The keeping of records is decisive. There is some form of security against 
arbitrary dismissal. The case is different with the NPM that operates a higher level of 
accountability, and stresses contracts not rules. The NPM is based on differences in outcomes 
and not stereotyped or pre determined results. It is management based on contract and little 
policy. In the old public administration system, the remuneration of officials is fixed, and is 
normally in the form of salaries. Officials have no independent status or income, and office 
does not become property. The jobs in the old public administration system carry a right to 
pensions and gratuities. 
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Post- Bureaucracy an Emerging Organizational Shift    
 
The post- bureaucratic era is characterized by some level of hybridism. Far from the end of 
bureaucracy, the post- bureaucratic configuration inserts the Weberian ideal type with 
democratic principles. Conceptions of post-bureaucracy combine elements of an organic 
structure with changed modalities of more indirect and internalized forms of control. The 
concept of post- bureaucracy as an emerging organizational shift is premised on unobtrusive 
peer- based team work controls. The rationalization process underlying Weber’s bureaucratic 
ideal-type has been criticized by some management scholars. The process of rationalization 
inherent in past bureaucratization resulted in diminution of freedom as officers were expected 
to become obedient subjects, encased in an “`iron cage”. From the perspective of ``late 
modern`` management theory, such bureaucratic organizations would be less efficient than 
those which foster the empowerment of employees and the decentralization of authority. The 
post –bureaucracy organization is not free from the Weberian ideal-type but combines the old 
rationalization mechanisms with new principles of networks and democracy (Osborne & 
Plastrik 1997: 88; Turner 1990: 92). 
 
Table3. Bureaucracy and Post- Bureaucracy in Government (Barzelay 1992:118, quoted in 
Oyeyinka 2006: 51; see also Jaffee 2001). 
 
Bureaucratic Elements Post – Bureaucratic Elements 
Public Interest Results Citizen Value 
Efficiency Quality and Value 
Administration Production 
Control  Winning adherence to norms 
 Specify function, authority, and structure Identify mission, service and customers. 
Justify Costs  Deliver Value 
Responsibility  Accountability 
 
Traditional public administration has been discredited theoretically and practically, and the 
adoption of new forms of public management means the emergence of a new paradigm in the 
public sector. This new paradigm poses a direct challenge to several of what had previously 
been regarded as fundamental principles of traditional public administration. The first of 
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these was that of bureaucracy; governments should organize themselves according to the 
hierarchical, bureaucratic principles most clearly enunciated in the classic analysis of 
bureaucracy by the German sociologist Max Weber (Gerth & Mills 1970: 101). Although 
adopted by business and other institutions, these precepts were carried out far more diligently 
and for longer period in the public sector. Secondly, there was one- best way of working and 
procedures were set out in comprehensive manuals for administrators to follow (Taylor 1911: 
98). The third principle was bureaucratic delivery; once government involved itself in a 
policy area, it also became the direct provider of goods and services through the bureaucracy. 
Fourth, the motivation of the individual public servant was assumed to be that of the public 
interest; in that service to the public was provided selflessly. Fifth, public administration was 
considered a special kind of activity and, therefore, required a professional bureaucracy, 
neutral, anonymous, employed for life, with the ability to serve any political master equally. 
Sixth, the tasks involved in public service were indeed administrative, in the sense, that 
public servants follow the instructions provided by others without personal responsibility for 
results.   
 
These seeming verities have been challenged. First, bureaucracy is powerful, but does not 
work well in all circumstances and has some negative consequences. Secondly, trying to find 
the one-best way is elusive and can lead to rigidity in operation. Flexible management 
systems pioneered by the private sector are being adopted by governments. Thirdly, delivery 
by bureaucracy is not the only way to provide public goods and services; governments can 
operate indirectly through subsidies, regulation or contracts, instead of always being the 
direct provider. Fourth, political and administrative matters have in reality been intertwined 
for a long time, but the implications of this for management structures are only being worked 
through. The public demands better mechanisms of accountability where once the 
bureaucracy operated separately from the society. Fifth, while there may be public servants 
motivated by the public interest, it now seems incontrovertible that they are political players 
in their own right. Sixth, the case for unusual employment conditions in the public services is 
now much weaker, especially given the changes that have taken place in the private sector 
where jobs for life are rare. The tasks involved in the public sector are now considered more 
managerial, that is, requiring some one to take responsibility for the achievement of results, 
instead of being regarded as administrative and with public servants merely following 
instructions. 
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Economic problems in the 1980s meant governments reassessed their bureaucracies and 
demanded changes. As Caiden (1991: 74) argued, “All blamed the dead hand of bureaucracy, 
especially the poor performance of public bureaucracies and the daily annoyances of irksome 
restrictions, cumbersome red-tape, unpleasant officials, poor service and corrupt practices.” A 
radical change in organizational culture is occurring, but not without cost.  
 
Governments still need a public service, but its size could be very small, confined to contract 
management and policy advice, even if much of that work could itself be contracted out. The 
traditional public service (old public administration) can be characterized as: an 
administration under the formal control of the political leadership, based on a strictly 
hierarchical model of bureaucracy, staffed by permanent, neutral and anonymous officials, 
motivated only by the public interest, marked with a level of stability, serving any governing 
party equally, and may not contribute to policy, but merely administering those policies 
decided by the politicians. Its theoretical foundations mainly derive from Woodrow Wilson 
and Friedrich Taylor in the United States, and Max Weber in Germany. 
 
 The traditional model of public administration is about the longest standing and most 
successful theory of management in the public sector; it is now being replaced however. Its 
elements still exist, but its theories and practices are now considered old-fashioned and no 
longer relevant to the needs of a rapidly changing society.  
 
The most important theoretical principle of the traditional model of administration is Weber’s 
theory of bureaucracy. In setting out a basis for his theory, Weber argued there were three 
types of authority: the charismatic - the appeal of an extra ordinary leader; the traditional- s 
set out six principles for modern systems of bureaucracy, deriving from the idea of rational-
legal authority (Gerth & Mills 1970: 196-198): 
1. The principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by 
rules, that is by laws or administrative regulations.   
2. The principle of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly 
ordered system of super-and sub- ordination in which there is supervision of the lower 
offices by the higher ones. 
3. The management of the modern office is based upon written document (“the files”)     
which are preserved. The body of officials actively engaged in “public” office, along 
with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files, make up a 
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’bureau’. In general, bureaucracy segregates official activity as something distinct 
from the sphere of private life. Public monies and equipment are divorced from the 
private property of the official.  
4. Office management, at least all specialized office management-and such management 
is distinctly modern- usually presupposes thorough and expert training. 
5. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity 
of the official.  
6. The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, 
more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules 
represents a special technical learning which the officials possess. 
 
The first of Weber’s principles means that authority derives from the law, and from rules 
made according to law. No other form of authority is to be followed. Following from this, the 
second principle is that of hierarchy. Strict hierarchy meant that rational/ legal authority and 
power were maintained organizationally, not by any individual but by the position he or she 
held in the hierarchy. Particular functions could be delegated to lower levels as the 
hierarchical structure meant that any official could act with the authority of the whole 
organization. The third point adds to this. The organization is something with an existence 
separate from the private lives of its employees; it is quite impersonal. Written documents are 
preserved, something that is essential, as previous cases become precedents when similar 
event recur.  
 
Only with the existence of files can the organization be consistent in its application of the 
rules. The fourth point is that administration is a specialist occupation, one deserving of 
thorough training, it was not something that could be done by anyone. Fifthly, working for 
the bureaucracy was a full time occupation instead of a secondary activity as it once was. 
Sixth, office management was an activity that could be learned as it followed general rules. 
These rules would presumably be carried out in the same way by whoever occupied a 
particular office (Stillman 1991: 107-109). 
 
2.2. Civil Service Reform as an Aspect of NPM  
 
The Government of Nigeria, like many others across the world, have been trying to privatize, 
to rationalize public expenditures, to improve efficiency and effectiveness of pubic policies, 
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and to  limit social spending, such as government subsidies on fertilizer and some other 
agricultural products. Accordingly, the government has implemented policies to privatize 
public enterprises, to downsize the public sector, by reforming the civil service, and stimulate 
entrepreneurial management, by way of contracting out government services. These efforts 
have increased in the last nine years. Furthermore, in doing these, the government have 
embraced the New Public Management, which is a response to the limitations of traditional 
public administration processes, particularly those producing bureaucratic dysfunctions. 
 
This step(s) of government is in accordance with the views of Osborne & Plastrik (1997: 8) 
who see NPM. as a “reinvention” and “redesign” that would reform public sector 
management by applying an “entrepreneurial model” in order to “maximize productivity and 
effectiveness in the public sector”.  
 
One of the main elements in NPM.is improving service delivery and emphasizing the citizen 
as customer. The development of a customer or a user focus in the Public Sector in order to 
achieve a more responsive bureaucracy has become very vital, and the provision of public 
goods and services has invariably become a critical issue in the current reform efforts (Pinto 
1998: 387) This view was further buttressed by Holmes & Shand (1995: 564) that 
establishing a service delivery orientation has become a widespread reform target, and the 
emphasis on user support in the public sector is now part of an overall focus on performance 
and on achieving a more responsive public sector. 
 
Over the years, the civil service in Nigeria had remained weak and inefficient. A plausible 
explanation relates to the higher level of corruption and rent-seeking opportunities, 
inappropriate incentive structures and a lack of the political will to implement “good” reform 
measures. There are as yet no operational guidelines for assessing the efficiency of the civil 
service. 
 
Although the various terms - new public management, managerialism, and entrepreneurial 
government - may vary, there is today more general agreement: they point to the same 
phenomenon. Improving public management, reducing budgets, privatization of public 
enterprises seem universal; no one is arguing for the increase in the scope of government or 
bureaucracy. While there have been striking similarities in the reforms carried out in a 
number of countries, it is believed by some scholars, that the greatest shift, is one of theory 
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rather than practice. The underlying theories of the traditional model of public administration; 
based on bureaucracy; one-best-way, the public interest and a separation of politics from 
administration, all had their problems. 
 
 The NPM is ‘a direct response to the inadequacies of traditional public administration- 
particularly to the inadequacies of public bureaucracies’ (Behn 2001: 30). The public 
management reforms have been driven by different underlying theories: that economic 
motivation can be assumed for all players in government; that private management flexibility 
provides lessons for government; and that there can be no separation of politics from 
administration. Above all, the change of theory from administration to management the 
former being about following instructions and the latter meaning to achieve results and to 
take personal responsibility for doing so.  
 
Recent changes to the public sector have led to fundamental questioning of its role and place 
in society. The main point here is that a new era governing the management of the public 
sector has emerged, one that moves the public service inexorably away from administration 
(traditional) towards management. Understandably, many public servants have felt under 
siege. Certainty and Order have been replaced by Uncertainty. Offices are organized and re-
organized, structured and restructured to a surprising extent. Redundancies have become 
common in a part of the workforce, where jobs were once for a lifetime. In future, the public 
service may provide an occupation for a very small core of people. Service delivery agencies, 
which need not contain government employees, may undertake the bulk of the day-to-day 
work under contracts with the small policy department (Stillman 1991.84-88).  
 
2.3. Challenges Facing Civil Service Reforms Implementation 
 
Public management reform consists of deliberate changes to the structures and processes of 
public sector organizations with the aim of getting them to run better. Furthermore, public 
management reforms focus on changes to the system by which civil servants are recruited, 
trained, evaluated, promoted, disciplined etc. With the increased bureaucratization of human 
activities, the growing importance of organization, administration and management had been 
recognized. (Caiden 1969: 25).  
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The motivation to rejuvenate Public Organizations in Nigeria was prompted by a continuous 
decline in Public finances and the need for the government to get more for less. The period 
after the oil boom, were to become a difficult time for the government. The economy of the 
country nose-dived, there was a slow down in economic activities accompanied by persistent 
public pressures for increased government intervention to reverse the situation. This forced 
the government to borrow on a large scale, which more or less, brought about a huge public 
debt, high rates of inflation, frequent devaluations of the Nigerian Currency (the Naira) and 
unfavorable financial policies imposed under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) The government was compelled to cut back, reduce expenditures, staff, investments 
and services and demanded higher productivity and better performance from the public 
sector. (Caiden 1991: 74-75). The bureaucracy came under severe criticism from many 
quarters, due to the poor performance of the public sector, cumbersome red tape, poor service 
delivery and corrupt practices. 
 
The various governments have embarked on reforms, since after independence, so as to 
reverse the negative trend both in the public sector and the overall economy. There have been 
seven reforms in the Public Service since Nigeria gained political independence from Britain. 
These reforms were not fully implemented, due largely to these and some other impediments: 
Frequency of mobility of senior civil servants. This trend have brought  about  a lack of 
continuity in Public policy (Phillips 1988: 15); The malady of corruption, which is 
widespread (Obasi 1988:92, haphazard training programs for public officers (Phillips 1988: 
22), incompetence (“square pegs in round holes”) Adamolekun 1985:150), self-interest of 
public officials (Dwivedi 1985: 61), weakness of Public accountability (Olowo 1985:12), and 
diversion of Public funds with impunity. There are also the issues of Longevity and seniority, 
used for promotion, instead of hard work and productivity, Civil servants attitude and 
Political interference (Achebe 1983: 15). The hiring and firing of civil servants are more 
often than not based on personal vendetta rather than on productivity- related indicators. The 
high incidence of corruption and the growth of the hidden economy have combined to serve 
as barrier to the implementation of civil service reforms in Nigeria. This, have render the 
Nigerian civil service and the rest of the economy inefficient. The phenomenal increase in the 
hidden economy, from less than 10 percent of G.D.P at independence to over 60 percent in 
the late 1990s, reflects the growth of the informal sector, itself fostered by the tax burden, 
unnecessary regulatory regimes, lack of institutional capacity and weak governance. Based 
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on the analysis above, it can be seen why the various civil service reforms in Nigeria, were 
not successfully implemented (Giles 1991: 378-380).  
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3. CIVIL SERVICE IN NIGERIA 
 
3.1. Historical and Structural Origins of the Nigerian Civil Service 
 
British administrative practices and conventions have heavily influenced the ways in which 
higher civil servants have been involved in public policy making in Nigeria. In the first place, 
the broadly defined role assumed by administrative officers in policy formulation and even in 
the provision of political advice can be seen as a legacy of a colonial system of government 
that had been predominantly administrative in character (Lofchie1967: 48; Ciroma 1979: 
215). 
 
In the years following independence, a ministerial conception of government structure, under 
which appointed career officials are found in virtually all posts in the upper reaches of the 
hierarchy (except as ministers) and therefore control most of the key positions in the 
decision-making process, has been sustained as the prevailing model of administrative 
organization (Mahoney 1968: 120-122; Ayida, cited in Bienen & Fitton 1978: 50). 
 
This structural arrangement has facilitated extensive bureaucratic involvement in policy 
formulation, advocacy, and execution. Nigerian officials readily adopted a norm of 
administrative behavior which not only permits, but expects that high ranking public servants 
will both take the initiative in developing public policy alternatives and implementation 
strategies and in advising their ministers `on the full implications of policy options open to 
the Government` (Ayida 1979: 217; Adamolekun 1978: 12-14; Asabia 1968: 68). 
 
Under the Whitehall model of administration, which was bequeathed to Nigeria, by the 
British, the permanent secretary served as the chief advisor to the minister and as the chief 
administrative officer. As paramount advisor, the permanent secretary is to engage in 
‘elaboration of policies and plans and to assist in the determination of the best means of 
carrying them out’ (Adamolekun 1978: 17-18). Higher civil servants (particularly permanent 
secretaries) played more than an advisory role in the public policy formulation process. 
Adebayo (1979: 18) maintains that  ‘the average’ politician, especially in the First Republic 
civilian regime, conceived his role as approving or disapproving whatever proposals or 
recommendations were placed before him by his Permanent Secretary. (Ayida 1979: 220-
228). 
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Higher civil servants have been central and often dominant participants in the policy 
formation process since the early stages of Nigeria’s political history (Adebayo 1979: 20).    
In principle, the execution of public policies has been the exclusive preserve of Nigerian 
public servants. According to the critics, ministerial intervention in the policy implementation 
realm subverted professional criteria in decision making, impaired administrative efficiency, 
promoted frustration and resentment within the public bureaucracy, and further accentuated 
role conflicts between political and administrative class officers (Aliyu 1979: 8).  
 
The civil service reforms carried out over the years in Nigeria had not really achieved the 
aims and objectives intended, which among other things, is the transformation of public 
sector and other sectors in the country. There have been some problematic areas that impede 
the actualization of a very successful civil service reform. Adi (1999: 40) noted the 
lopsidedness of the various reforms as a major constraint. Olowo, Otobo & Otokoni (1997: 
62) cited lack of sensitivity of the political context of the reform; absence of measures to 
ensure the success of public administration in post-independence Nigeria; unduly 
centralization of the management of the public service; and inadequate follow-through 
mechanisms for implementation of the reforms recommendations.  
 
In the light of these problems, the NPM approach, is therefore necessary to correct the 
mistakes of the strategies employed in the various attempts to create a highly effective and 
efficient bureaucracy. This is so, because the NPM theory, have been tested in recent years 
and proved quite successful, based on its dynamics. Although a myriad of factors contributed 
to the failure of civil service reforms in Nigeria, some scholars have also identified lack of 
financial resources, poor leadership, weak governance, ethnic fragmentation, increased 
political interference, and widespread corruption. 
 
3.1.1. The Westminster-Whitehall Model and Nigerian Public Service 
 
The Westminster-Whitehall Model was essentially a creation of the British Government, 
when Nigeria, had not attained its independence. It was based on a strict dichotomy between 
politics and administration or a near total separation between political and administrative 
careers in government.  
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The British had bequeathed this system on the Nigerian politico-administration. This Model 
is the adoption of British ideas and practices. It entails the notion that, if the policies were 
correct, the administrative arrangements were appropriate and the staff were sufficiently 
public spirited to serve impartially, disinterestedly, honorably and follow correct channels, 
then administration would look after itself. According to this Model, what was necessary was 
getting the right people, the right decisions and the right rules. 
 
However, with the growth of the Nigerian State, the increase in government activities, and 
the expansion of the bureaucracy, the right people, decisions and rules were insufficient to 
ensure economic productivity, efficient and effective public sector performance. This Model 
was becoming unsuitable in the Nigerian Society, given the differences in the culture, values, 
ethos, beliefs of Nigeria and that of Britain. The Model, based on the emerging realities, 
became inappropriate and more or less detrimental to the Nigerian system (see Hennessy 
1989: 174; Nellis 1986: 2). 
 
Administrative reforms in Nigeria, like in other countries of Africa and beyond, have been 
met with limited success, because most aspects of these reforms are often imitative of 
western experiences, which are far detached from the indigenous social context, away from 
local power structure and political culture. These reforms over the years have tended to 
discount the reality of inherent social conflict, elitist rural power structure, and unequal 
administrative access. 
 
The colonial legacy in the Nigerian bureaucracy is evident even in the inherited pejorative 
features of bureaucracy such as elitism, paternalism, despotism, distrust, centralization, 
secrecy, formalism, aloofness, hierarchical rigidity, and urban bias (Schaffer 1978: 175-177). 
 
British administrative practices and conventions have heavily influenced the ways in which 
higher civil servants have been involved in public policy making in Nigeria. In the first place, 
the broadly defined role assumed by administrative officers in policy formulation and even in 
the provision of political advice can be seen as a legacy of a colonial system of government 
that had been predominantly administrative in character (Lofchie1967:48; Ciroma 1979:215). 
 
In the years following independence, a ministerial conception of government structure, under 
which appointed career officials are found in virtually all posts in the upper reaches of the 
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hierarchy (except as ministers) and therefore control most of the key positions in the 
decision-making process, has been sustained as the prevailing model of administrative 
organization (Mahoney 1968: 120-122; Ayida, cited in Bienen & Fitton 1978: 50). 
 
 This structural arrangement has facilitated extensive bureaucratic involvement in policy 
formulation, advocacy, and execution. Nigerian officials readily adopted a norm of 
administrative behavior which not only permits, but expects that high ranking public servants 
will both take the initiative in developing public policy alternatives and implementation 
strategies and in advising their ministers `on the full implications of policy options open to 
the Government` (Ayida1979: 217; Adamolekun 1978: 12-14; Asabia 1968: 68). 
 
Under the Whitehall model of administration, which was bequeathed to Nigeria, by the 
British, the permanent secretary served as the chief advisor to the minister and as the chief 
administrative officer. As paramount advisor, the permanent secretary is to engage in 
`elaboration of policies and plans and to assist in the determination of the best means of 
carrying them out` (Adamolekun 1978: 17-18). Higher civil servants (particularly permanent 
secretaries) played more than an advisory role in the public policy formulation process. 
Adebayo (1979: 18) maintains that  ‘the average politician, especially in the First Republic 
civilian regime, conceived his role as approving or disapproving whatever proposals or 
recommendations were placed before him by his Permanent Secretary` (cf. Ayida 1979:220-
228). 
 
Higher civil servants have been central and often dominant participants in the policy 
formation process since the early stages of Nigeria’s political history (Adebayo 1979: 20).    
In principle, the execution of public policies has been the exclusive preserve of Nigerian 
public servants. According to the critics, ministerial intervention in the policy implementation 
realm subverted professional criteria in decision making, impaired administrative efficiency, 
promoted frustration and resentment within the public bureaucracy, and further accentuated 
role conflicts between political and administrative class officers (Aliyu 1979: 8). 
 
3.1.2. Institutional Framework and Prevailing Culture 
 
Civil service reform cannot be separated from the culture of any society, in which it is 
intended to be carried out. The culture of a people, to a very large extent, determines the way 
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they see things, accept a change, and react to the change(s). So, for a reform to be successful, 
the issue of culture, in relation to public service culture, should be properly noted. Institution 
building, according to North (1990: 76), is a very vital development process. The Public 
Service is an institution at the heart of government policy formulation and implementation, 
and its influences, can determine the success or failure of governments.  The mind set of a 
people, is largely shaped by the existing value(s), which is also a part of the overall culture of 
the people. For a reform to be successful, it should aim at influencing public service behavior 
in an orderly and mutually re-enforcing manner. 
 
Adamolekun (1985: 307), posits, that “to generate the energy to break out of the status quo, 
the reform effort must be ambitious, and must be informed by a clear appreciation of political 
and capacity tolerances”. No reform will be sustainable, if it lacks sufficient popular support. 
Reforms require leaders who can persuade others there is a better way, and realistic 
information about the state of the nation and the consequences of leaving things as they are 
(Dudley 1968: 120). 
 
Public Sector reforms is targeted at changing deeply- seated and complex behavior, so, it 
should recognize the difficulty of the challenge, and be aware of the dynamics of the society 
in question which in this case is Nigeria .There is the need for proper mobilization of the full 
range of influences on human behavior in order to achieve its goals. There should be some 
leverage or opportunity for those with ideas about how to make reforms successful, and 
ensure that they are involved in it.      
 
A potentially very difficult problem facing any government intending to transform its public 
sector is how to deal with the organized public service labor force. The Unions tend to be one 
of the most powerful groups with interests vested in the status quo, and they tend to see 
reforms as threatening to the interests of their members. (Olusanya 1975: 220). Civil Servants 
in Nigeria, due to the entitlements and some other benefits and rights, tend to have a culture 
of loyalty over time, and performance, is given a second place, while time-serving behavior is 
common place (Otobo 1999: 292). 
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3.2. Increasing Centralization of the Public Administration System   
 
Another general problem in Nigerian administration is related to the above. Perhaps, it is 
inevitable that several years of military rule should produce an increasingly centralized 
administrative system. With the exception of the successful attempt to disinvest the public 
sector in the 1980s, the trend in the last two decades has been for resources and personnel to 
become   more centralized in terms of the relationship between the civil service proper and 
other units within the public service. (Olowo 1989: 18-20.) 
 
 For a country which has about 70% of its citizens in rural areas that are outside the major 
cities where headquarters are located it is amazing that not only are most government   
resources spent in the urban centres but that the majority of government officials live and 
work in the headquarters.  This might be one area in which Nigeria, have departed, from the 
norms of the colonial service with the emphasis shifting since independence from the field to 
the headquarters. (Murray 1970: 229-231; Adebayo 1981: 94).  
 
A weakened civil service leadership leads to a situation in which the policy process is 
dominated by poorly skilled politicians and external consultants (Hyden 1984: 98). Apart 
from the fact that this results in defective policies, it has also heighten the centralized nature 
of the civil service. Still, is widely known that the closer the providers are to the users of any 
service, the more efficient and effective the services are likely to be.  
 
3.3. Decline in the Civil Service 
 
The civil service in Nigeria, over the last three decades has been more or less on a decline. It 
has clearly deteriorated in almost every way since the 1970s. The need to overhaul the civil 
service becomes very obvious. Civil service reforms in Nigeria have been restricted to 
tinkering around the edges. The emergence of local community self –help initiatives, brought 
about as a result of the failure of the civil service to perform its roles, is a cause for hope. 
Even though these groups cannot fully take the place of a well-functioning public service, 
they offer a way out of the current morass and can serve as models for improving the official 
civil service. According to Campo (1994: 241), “Any genuine improvement in the civil 
service is likely to be fiscally costly”.  
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A change in the ideological disposition of the ruling groups at the federal or state level may 
result in the imposition of new goals and priorities on service providers. Public Organizations 
may be prone to bureaucratic congestion and red tape (Boyne 2002: 97). Further, Downs 
(1967: 68) posits that the “life cycle” of public bureaucracies is characterized by a positive 
relationship between age and conservative behavior, which implies that the “liability of 
oldness” may be more pronounced in the public sector than it would in the private sector. 
 
It is almost a general assumption among the ruling elites that one of the best ways to fix 
government bureaucracy is to adopt private sector practices. In Nigeria, a big challenge 
facing the public service is the lack of esteem, in which it is held. So, this fact is seen as one 
issue that led to the decline in the civil service. 
 
 Analysts of public administration, hold the opinion, that efforts to revitalize the civil service, 
should be undertaken “through people”. They also argue that the future of the civil service, 
depend on how civil servants feel about their institution and their work and how they are 
treated. There is a notion held in some quarters, that there is a general decline in loyalty 
towards the institution of the civil service (Bourgon 1993: 3-4). 
 
3.3.1. Erosion of public service salaries 
 
At the level of the bureaucracy, the Nigerian Government in the 1980s, was seen as being 
“big” and therefore “wasteful and inefficient in economic management” (Essien1990: 86). 
The Federal Government was  advised to scale down its role in economic activities and to 
down size the Public Service to make it more affordable. It was expected that this would 
reduce government’s expenditures and the “cut back strategy” would result in a leaner 
government more focused on “core activities” (Adebayo 2001:94). The Federal 
Government’s economic policies affected its expenditures. The Civil Service was not spared. 
The dismal economic performance had adverse effect on the salaries and remunerations of 
staff. Long periods of wage freezes resulted in reduced spending power of workers. This was 
further worsened by “wage erosion and compression” of remuneration of senior civil servants 
in Nigeria (Olowo & Adamolekun 1999: 87-106). Inflation adversely affected living wages; 
salary reviews to examine the consequences of continual fall in real wages were rarely carried 
out. Even when they were done, the salaries of the least paid are better reviewed (in terms of 
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amount of remuneration) than the highest paid due to populist rather than rational 
considerations, leading to severe wage compression. 
 
The salaries of staff could no longer sustain them and their families. Absenteeism and late 
coming to work  rose, as staff started engaging themselves in other economic activities in 
order to maintain themselves, and augment the amount paid by the government (Adebayo 
Adedeji 2001: 96). 
 
3.3.2. Decline in Public Service Efficiency    
 
There is the general impression that efficiency in the public service has fallen both in terms of 
a temporal comparison with an earlier period (Balogun 1983: 214-231) and in terms of 
comparisons with the private sector. Some scholars have contended these assessments. But 
the significant thing, are the actions currently being taken to strengthen the public service on 
the basis of the assumptions that either the Nigerian public sector is inefficient or that it has 
overreached itself. One response has been the wave of privatization and commercialization. 
Another response has been the reform of the civil service (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1988: 
Decree 43).  
 
Rigid bureaucracy unable to adjust to changing circumstance, persisting with outmoded 
attitudes and arrangements, and relying on heavy- handed enforcement. The civil service is 
too large in the broad sense that in many states, the public sector is over extended, that is, it 
possesses too many agencies and organizations, charged with too broad a span of 
responsibilities, and in the narrower sense that too many of these agencies employ numbers 
of people excessive to requirements. They are too expensive in the sense that public sector 
wage bills constitute a high percentage of total government revenues and also account for a 
high percentage of the GDP. Many civil servants are insufficiently productive in the sense 
that they do not fulfill the tasks assigned to them (they are ineffective), or they carry out their 
assignments partially, with much delays, at high cost (they are inefficient) (Adamolekun 
1986: 33-34).    
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3.4.   Obstacles to” Grand” Civil Service Reform 
 
Civil service reform may be defined  either in a restricted sense as the re organization of    
public service  management or, broadly, as the human dimension of administrative re 
organization- to deliver public services more efficiently and effectively. 
 
Nigeria, like many developing nations inherited a colonial legacy with significant 
dependency on colonial powers of the West, and its administrative system suffer profound 
deficiencies. Development administration has suffered from  chronic ailments of dependency, 
instability, and policy confusion. To reform and re organize the administrative system for 
both development and service delivery, Nigeria need to break the chains of dependency on 
exogenous determinants, establish a stable political system that can sustain the course of civil 
service reform, and formulate clear policies that will steer actions towards desired goals.  
 
Public service reform and re organization efforts are often conceived, mainly for the political 
motives of mobilizing for national independence, anti-corruption, economic market 
expansion etc. Corruption is often functional by design to promote the anomalies of 
administrative reforms. So, reforming the administrative system alone becomes a futile 
exercise when, the legitimacy and credibility of the whole system are in question in the 
public’s eye. Similarly, resistance to reform- induced changes are not taken in the structure of 
that power that perpetuates itself. Success of reform is directly related to regime legitimacy 
and the popular perception of the genuineness of any reform (Farazmand 1989: 88; 1998: 93). 
 
Another obstacle in the way of achieving a ``grand`` public service reform, is the confusion 
over the meaning of the term reform. Administrative reform means different things to 
different nations with varying political systems. In most industrialized nations, it generally 
means`` a process of changes in the administrative structures or procedures within the public 
service because they have become out of line with the expectations of the social and political 
environment`` (Chapman & Greenway 1980: 98). In developing nations, administrative often 
is referred to as modernization and change in society to effect social and economic 
transformation (Farazmand 1999a: 9). The term means one thing to politicians and another to 
administrators, academic scholars, and functionally specialized personnel. 
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Any attempt to effect administrative reform must also take into account the relationship 
between local and central administrations; the social, political, and economic forces of 
society; and the interaction between ideas or concepts and practical necessities developed 
overtime. The gap between ideals and realities may grow overtime if administrative reform is 
not taken seriously, despite the fact that other may still pose obstacles to its huge success. 
This gap must be mitigated by both legitimacy and performance (Farazmand 1998b: 95).  
 
It is very expensive to carry out a very successful civil service reform. Nigeria, like many 
other developing countries in, and outside of Africa, finds it quite difficult to embark on such 
civil service revitalization. Smart civil services are financially demanding to maintain, not 
only in terms of the pay and remunerations of the elite staff, which must be competitive with 
the private sector, but due also to their spatial, equipment and other operational requirements. 
 
The contents of the reforms had been problematic, likewise the strategy adopted in 
introducing them. Key stakeholders, the civil servants have been excluded more often than 
not, though it was perceived that the greater participation by the stakeholders might make the 
reforms more successful. Further, civil service reforms are largely disconnected from other 
political and economic reforms. The reforms did not include critical public sector reform 
issues, such as decentralization, strengthening accountability and improving transparency 
which is all very crucial to achieving a grand civil service reform (Gibbon 1996: 751). 
 
The failure to pay attention to the socio political and economic environment into which 
Weberian bureaucracy were transplanted in the past four to five decades is an obstacle of 
successful civil service reform. Some other obstacles are; lack of state continuity, the near 
absence of accountability to the governed by public officials, the many years of military rule 
since independence, had  all played a major part in obstructing the success of civil service 
reforms in Nigeria. This has manifested in the abandoning of the principles of security of 
tenure and political neutrality because, partisanship with the military was a necessity and 
military arbitrariness overrode security of tenure. Further, the triumph of patronage politics 
resulted in the subordination of the principles underpinning the Weberian bureaucratic model 
to patronage considerations. This led to appointments into the leadership positions of the civil 
service  the acolytes of political patrons. 
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3.4.1. Bureaucratic Elites and the Masses 
 
In Nigeria, the state agencies have served the interests of various social elites, but for the 
urban underclass and the rural masses, these bureaucratic agencies remain unreachable, 
inaccessible, and indifferent. Further, the top bureaucratic elites are usually accustomed to 
Western values and lifestyles, acquired through Western education and training, which in turn 
led to the secularization of the state elite. However, these imitative values and elitist lifestyles 
are often incompatible with the cultural beliefs and modes of life of the masses, and their 
inability or lack of capacity to afford such expensive ways of living (Rosberg 1994: 10).  
 
The masses to a large extent have no confidence in the public bureaucracy, they see the top 
bureaucrats as working against their collective interest, and view the bureaucrats’ actions as 
working at cross purposes with theirs. This incompatibility between the top bureaucrats and 
the citizens has affected the overall development of Society. 
 
3.4.2. Leadership Resistance to Change 
 
Staff training and development is a purposeful corporate function directed towards the 
acquisition of job- relevant skills, so that the corporate enterprise may perform as optimally 
as possible. However, while the acquisition of such skills is important, the benefit to 
corporate performance depends on the extent to which opportunities exist for the application 
of the skills acquired. (Balogun 1983: 8). 
 
Where leadership support is freely and adequately given for the application of skills acquired 
through training, individual and corporate performance is likely to be high; the converse is 
likely, however, where application is denied. Evidence abounds regarding the denial of this 
vital support by organization superiors. Such evidence is provided by Taylor (1972: 12), who 
highlighted 12 strategies used by supervisors to stifle innovative ideas, as follows 
 
By virtue of this position, the supervisor has seen himself as being more intelligent than any 
of his subordinates; therefore, whatever innovative ideas that should be implemented have to 
come from him and not his less intelligent subordinates.    
1. He will normally ignore scientific research and results that ascribe innovative wisdom 
to subordinates.   
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2. The supervisor will teach his subordinates only those areas of the job that can be 
performed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the rules and regulations.  
3. Since his own innovative ideas as a subordinate were not accepted, the supervisor will 
not accept those that emanate from his own subordinates.  
4. Whenever new ideas are proposed, the supervisor will promptly react negatively.  
5. He will normally oppose ideas that are not clear to him. 
6. He will adhere strictly to the rule, because creative ideas that do not conform to the 
rule might spell trouble. 
7. The supervisor will develop an attitude of rejection towards ideas from those who 
appear creative. 
8. He will strive to maintain the status quo because it is easier than trying out new ideas. 
9. He will ensure that creativity within his control is killed. 
10. The supervisor will build into the organization designs or mechanisms that kill    
creativity. 
11. The Supervisor, will jealously guard and keep the prerogative of creativity and 
innovation to himself alone. 
 
Such leaders, Taylor emphasizes, are the killers of new ideas. Leadership resistance to change 
revealed in the foregoing, led Boettinger (1977: 87), to affirm that the trained personnel who 
apply learning to achieve change are themselves leaders. So are the superior and/or others 
who help to push the idea into acceptance and implementation after due consideration and 
assessment of its practicality and benefit. For Lynton & Pareek (1978: 5), obstructing the 
application of acquired skills and attitudes is not intrinsically different from resistance to 
innovation elsewhere. Hicks & Gullet (1976: 34) studied the ills of bureaucracy as they affect 
formal organizations by preventing superior officers from appreciating contributions which 
are innovative and which hence do not strictly accord with role expectations of subordinates.  
 
Rigidity, as highlighted by Hicks and Gullet, appears to be one of the most dysfunctional 
elements of bureaucracy. It is seen as non- adaptive, leading to strict adherence to regulations 
which, in the authors` words, produce` timidity`, `conservatism` and `technicism`. In an 
earlier work, Downs (1967: 11) explained that superior officers resort to being rigid in a 
bureaucratic situation for fear of losing power, prestige and income. This is because they 
occupy positions in which decision-making is inherently a risky process because decisions 
can prove to be wrong and/or unpopular. Superior officers in such bureaucratic organizations 
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therefore tend to be `avoiders` who try to escape responsibility for making decisions.  
However, since it is inevitable that they do make decisions, they resort to applying rigidly the 
rules of procedure promulgated by higher authorities. 
 
Many superior officers generally eschew even the slightest deviation from written procedures 
unless they obtain approval from higher authority. Thus, rigid and strict adherence to rules 
and regulations becomes a shield that protects officers from being blamed for mistakes.  This 
attitude of rigidity and its attendant problems, which include delays in obtaining official 
rulings for unusual situations, leads to stereotyped conditions which Downs refers to as` the 
bureaucratic mentality` and `red- tape`. 
 
The rigidity in roles occasioned by strict adherence to rules and regulations often creates a 
situation where officers perform their jobs without any emotional attachment, particularly 
when subordinates come up with official problems. This is another ill of bureaucratic 
organization, highlighted by Hicks and Gullet and referred to by Thompson (1975: 24) as 
‘impersonality’ in the performance of official responsibilities. Thompson (1975: 25) stresses 
that trainers outside the bureaucratic organization impart to their trainees who belong to such 
organizations what is naturally seen as essential for organization improvement. Back in the 
organization, attempts by the trained personnel to implement what has been acquired from the 
training receives stiff resistance, especially where the knowledge acquired does not accord 
with straight- jacketed and expected behavior of the officer. 
 
The result is that often such a trainee would not be fully trusted by either his peers or his 
superiors and is hence not quite trust worthy from the organization’s standpoint. Tremendous 
pressure will consequently be put upon him to return to the ‘old, safe, and predictable pre-
training role’. Within a few months of completion of the training, ideas acquired from the 
training may be forgotten. Where they are not forgotten, the trainee gets frustrated and 
consequently covertly or overtly displays frustration.   
 
In summing up the above arguments, Hicks & Gullet (1976: 34) posit that bureaucracy has 
many unintended consequences or dysfunctions. They further describe bureaucracy as a 
‘machine model’ that is non- adaptive and impersonal. Its rigidity leads to its failure to 
account adequately for many important human characteristics. In their view, innovative ideas 
are seen by bureaucratic officials as disturbances to an otherwise ordered situation. Such 
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ideas are therefore never seen as a necessary life-giving element to an evolving, adaptive 
organization. 
 
These dysfunctional characteristics of bureaucracy are found in the Nigerian situation. The 
Public Service Review Commission observed that the Nigerian Public Services are 
characterized by a spirit of animosity and jealousy, rather than of cooperation and teamwork. 
This spirit of animosity exists between peers, as well as between superiors and subordinates. 
In fact the animosity and jealousy become very high when a subordinate is perceived by his 
superior officer as being very innovative and therefore a threat to him. 
 
In order to forestall the implementation of innovative ideas that emanate from trained 
subordinates, the superior officers resort to strict adherence to rules and regulations which, 
they often argue, are at variance with the innovation being contemplated. In obvious 
reference to this state of affairs, the Commission, in paragraph 40 of its main report, noted 
that: ` Our examination of the ministry reveals that majority of their staff takes a narrow view 
of their responsibilities. There is a tendency to concentrate on rules, regulations and 
procedures. These rules are not sufficiently positive, nor are they devised to meet the new 
tasks and the development needs of government. They reflect more concern over rights and 
prerequisites than obligations; more concern over security and job protection than 
creativeness and productivity. Personnel officers act as watch dogs of the rules and their 
application` (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1974). 
 
In a similar vein, Balogun (1983: 10) identified resistance to innovative ideas as one of the 
factors that differentiate the Nigerian public sector from its private sector counterpart in 
situations where public administration is linked with the private sector. According to him, the 
tendency to resist innovative ideas is higher in public management. Other factors identified 
by Balogun (1983: 12)  which are inextricably linked with `resistance to innovative ideas` are 
survival, maintenance of the status quo, risk avoidance, mistake avoidance, self-
protectiveness, fear of trouble, fear of the unknown and retroactivity (firefighting). 
 
Other evidence of the stifling of innovative ideas (particularly where such ideas emanate 
from trained subordinates) in the Nigerian Civil Service is provided by Dotun Phillips (1985: 
10). observed that the decision – making process and implementation mechanics of the Civil 
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Service have been highly criticized by both Government and the public as bureaucratic, slow, 
rigid, secretive and not development- oriented. 
 
A major cause of the aforementioned problems, according to him, is the inability of senior 
officers to take decisions unless a clearance is obtained from the top most senior officer in 
whom all authority is vested. He also felt that the tendency is for trivial issues to go through a 
long chain of officers before a decision is taken. 
 
This situation leads not only to time wasting, but also kills the initiative and discretion of 
intermediate officers, leading to frustration and lack of confidence in the ability of officers to 
take decisions. In such circumstances, therefore, innovative ideas emanating from 
subordinates are not accepted by a superior officer, who feels that he is incompetent to 
implement such ideas, and similarly feels reluctant to pass such suggestion to the point where 
a decision could be taken because of the long chain of officers it will pass through. Even 
when suggestions are so passed, they never see the light of the day because they are `killed` 
somewhere along the line. Phillips therefore suggested a short-circuiting of this long process 
of decision –taking by limiting policy formulation to the management and directorate levels 
(i.e. grade levels 13-17). This, it is hoped, would break ‘bureaucratic bottlenecks’ in decision- 
taking in the Service. 
 
The point of emphasis from the fore going is that new ideas are not applied in the Civil 
Service because they infringe upon rules and regulations. This has led to the inability of 
superior officers to appreciate contributions made by their trained subordinates. This, 
however, has certain implications: A measure of legitimacy of modern government is the 
enthusiasm of the trained subordinates will be dampened to the degree ,in which, there  will 
be a loss of productivity in the service .important diversities in the Trainees will leave the 
Service in frustration. Resistance to innovative management practices, when and where 
initiated by subordinates, tends to stimulate two types of adjustment in the latter group. The 
usual adjustment strategy is for innovative subordinate to reverse to the status quo ante, either 
on a permanent basis or temporarily until he has enough status and authority to implement his 
ideas. Until then, the benefits of training and the skills acquired therein are lost to his 
organization a more unusual strategy observed by Fleishman (1955: 94), Sykes (1962: 25), 
leaves the Service & Bobbitt. (1978: 26), is recourse to the exit option, where by the stalled 
member of staff leaves the office. 
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4. EFFORTS TO REFORM NIGERIAN CIVIL SERVICE. 
 
In 1914, the British colonialists amalgamated the Southern and Northern Protectorates of 
Nigeria, for their easy and more effective governance. Thereafter, the Indirect Rule was 
introduced, which was successful in the North, but not too successful in the South, especially 
among the Igbo’s in the South-East. 
 
Twenty years after the amalgamation, the Hunts Commission was set up in 1934. This 
Commission was followed by five others during the colonial period, and seven more reforms 
had been carried out since Independence. There have been thirteen (13) Civil Service 
Reforms in Nigeria, all aimed at: taking the Civil Service to a higher level of productivity, 
performance, development, efficiency and innovativeness.  
 
There have been efforts to improve, re organize and revitalize the Public Sector, as well as to 
modernize public management processes and training. Administrative modernization still 
consisted largely of borrowing and transferring Western norms of public administration 
(Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy, Westminster type civil service, annual budget, 
financial management systems, decentralization, etc.) and building government 
administrative capacity to deal with development problems (Adamolekun 1989: 50; Caiden 
1991: 244). 
 
However, some of the administrative reforms in Nigeria over the years, have more or less, 
been furthering the interests of the country’s leaders and their loyalists. It is an open secret, 
that reforms in the Public Service, is one way of “feathering the nests” of friends, for those in 
authority. 
 
The civil service, due to the vital role(s) it plays in the formulation, implementation, 
evaluation, and review of government policies and programs, needs reform, so as to provide 
an enabling environment for civil servants to perform their duties in an unfettered manner, 
provide for a fair treatment of personnel, and in the establishment of a demographically 
representative apparatus. 
 
The main purpose of civil service reform is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
service and thereby increasing its capacity to promote economic and social development to 
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meet the needs and aspirations of all citizens (Corkey 1997: 98). Moreover, a competent and 
motivated civil service is a prerequisite for maintenance of public goods and services, fiscal 
management and sustainability, and efficient and effective performance of government 
.Ideally, civil service reform should focus on creating a `government workforce with the size, 
skills, culture and accountability necessary for delivering quality public services and perform 
vital governmental functions`` (Corkey 1997: 98).  
 
In Nigeria, as in most African countries, the civil service deteriorated in capability, integrity, 
and morale in the past three decades (Campos & Root. 1996:10). Consequently, social 
demands placed upon state institutions have rapidly diminished, the public sector has become 
less creative and efficient, state’s capacity to fulfill its obligations to the public has weakened 
and gradually a crisis evolved in the Nigerian public institutions. In an attempt to halt further 
degradation in the civil service, virtually all post-independence governments took some 
measures to reform or improve the skills, integrity, incentives of civil servants and overall 
performance of the civil service.    
 
By the beginning of the 1990s, a new model of public sector management had emerged in 
most advanced countries and many developing ones. Initially, the new model had several 
names, including ‘managerialism` (Pollitt 1993: 96); “new public management’ (Hood 1991: 
19); ‘market-based public administration’ (Lan & Rosenbloom 1992: 6) or “entrepreneurial 
government” (Osborne & Gaebler 1992: 88) the “post-bureaucratic-bureaucratic paradigm” 
(Barzelay 1992: 18). Despite the differing names, they all essentially describe the same 
phenomenon. This new approach to public management would emphasize results, a focus on 
clients, outputs and outcomes; it would use management by objectives and performance 
measurement, the use of markets and market-type mechanisms in place of centralized 
command-and–control-style regulation, competition and choice, and devolution with a better 
matching of authority, responsibility and accountability. 
 
4.1. British Influences  
 
During the colonial era, the Nigerian civil service was dominated by imperial European 
officials with power concentrated in the hands of a few of them (appointed colonial officers).  
The main function of the imperial civil service was maintenance of law and order.  The 
colonial government adopted the process of “Nigerianization”, a process that involved rapid 
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replacement of foreign or imperial administrators in the civil service with the nationally- 
oriented qualified Nigerians over a decade prior to Nigeria`s attainment of independence. In 
1952, the colonial government set up the Philipson-Adebo Commission to review the phase 
of the Nigerianization process. By the time the commission submitted its report two years 
later, the 1954 Constitution had declared Nigeria as a federation, thus shifting attention from 
issues and concerns about Nigerianization to regionalization of the country’s civil service 
(Otobo 1999: 75).  
 
The Elwood Grading Team of 1966 and the Adebo Commission of 1971 constituted the 
government’s early post-independence initiatives to reform the Nigerian civil service.  
Although less comprehensive in scope, both commissions attempted to upgrade the salaries 
of civil servants and entrench professionalism and high ethical standards within the civil 
service. 
 
4.2. Post- Independence Era 
 
 The most renowned civil service reform measures undertaken in post independence Nigeria 
included the Public Service Review Commission of 1972 or the Udoji Commission of 1972, 
and the Ayida Panel of 1994. While the  scope of these three major  civil service reform 
initiatives differed slightly, they shared similar objectives, most notably: creation of an 
accountable, transparent, and responsive civil service: improvement of civil service efficiency 
and effectiveness; upgrading of civil servants skills through training; provision of adequate 
remuneration for civil servants; and reorganization of government ministries.     
 
Scholars of Nigerian public administration consider the Udoji Commission of 1972 the 
boldest and comprehensive attempt by the government to provide the desired direction for the 
civil service in post-independence Nigeria. Unlike earlier civil service review proposals, the 
Udoji Report encompassed broader reform issues including the desire to adopt  new 
management techniques such as Management by Objectives  (MBO),  Planning Programming 
Budgeting System (PPBS), Project Management (PM), and Open Reporting System (ORS). 
 
Other specific  recommendations of the Udoji Commission included the need to simplify 
policies and practices on civil service grading  and salary administration;  adjust salaries and 
wages to  inflation ; establish a minimum wage policy pay in the  public sector; adopt a new 
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code of ethics for public officials; create an anti-corruption bureau and complaints 
commission; and establish training and retraining programs to acquaint civil servants with 
proposed managerial orientations  (Olowo et al 1997: 78).    
 
The recommendations of the Udoji Commission initially gave the civil service the desired 
direction and motivation it sought. Ultimately, however, the government implemented only 
the remuneration and placement aspect of the report and either abandoned or partially 
implemented the rest of the recommendations. 
 
Researchers have identified several factors that accounted for the lack luster of the 
government’s response to the Udoji Report. Adamolekun (1986: 47) cited the absence of   
“political will and committed leadership” as a key impediment to full implementation of the 
recommendations. Adi (1999: 27) noted the lopsidedness of the reforms as a major constraint.   
Olowo, Otobo & Otokoni (1997: 80) cited lack of sensitivity of the  political context of the 
reform; absence of measures to ensure the success of public administration in  post-military  
Nigeria; unduly centralization of the management of the public service; and inadequate 
follow- through mechanisms for implementation of the recommendations as the major 
problems.    
 
The Civil Service Reorganization Decree of 1988 or Decree 43 constituted the next major and 
comprehensive set of reforms. Decree 43 drew heavily from the recommendations of an 
earlier study commonly referred to as the Philip’s Report (1984) which examined the inherent 
weaknesses in the Nigerian bureaucracy and proposed ways to improve its efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Based on the recommendations of this report, Decree 43 sought to:  promote 
professionalism; enhance accountability; reorganize government ministries, down size the 
civil service; decentralize or delegate more responsibilities to lower levels of government; 
improve incentives; and align the civil service with the presidential system of government 
(Phillips 1991: 13). 
 
The primary objective of Decree 43 was to create  “virile, dynamic, and results oriented civil 
service” based on a new performance evaluation scheme (Lovejoy 1992: 239). A review of 
the government’s implementation of Decree 43 indicated that it failed to produce an efficient, 
morally upright, dynamic and service oriented bureaucracy (Adi 1999: 24). According to 
critics, the implementation of Decree 43 compromised the statutory functions of the civil 
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service and undermined its integrity and accountability.  Specifically, the implementation of 
Decree 43 led to undue politicization of the civil service, destruction of the merit system in 
hiring and promotion, breakdown of discipline, and disregard for financial accountability and 
probity in the public sector (Adi 1999:38). 
 
The Ayida Review Panel of 1994 constituted the last major set of civil service reforms 
proposed in Nigeria. Perpetual inefficiency triggered the establishment of this panel.  Named 
after its chairman, Allison Ayida, a seasoned generalist in the Nigerian civil service, the 
Ayida Panel identified multi-dimensional problems in the civil service including widespread 
discontent and low morale due to poor working conditions, low remuneration, and job 
insecurity. In an attempt to improve the effectiveness and performance of the civil service, 
the Ayida Review Panel recommended the government to   
 
• Abrogate Decree 43 of 1988 or reverse the civil service reforms of 1988 or go back to 
the system prior to the 1988 reforms,  
• Repeal Decree 17 of 1984 or the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Decree                 
Which empowered government to summarily dismiss civil servants without Due   
Process, 
• Undertake substantial upward review of civil servants salaries and Allowances 
harmonize remuneration in all public-funded institutions including public enterprises, 
and    
• Implement structural and attitudinal changes to ensure probity and Accountability in 
the civil service.  
 
The government’s white paper on the Ayida Review Panel issued in 1997endorsed the 
Panel’s recommendations without significant changes. However, with the exception of 
abrogating Decree 43 and a boost in minimum wage for Civil Servants, the rest of the 
recommendations of the panel remain unimplemented, or at best partially implemented as at 
late December 2000. (Ayida 1979: 217-229.)  
 
In post independence Nigeria, the quality of virtually all leaders had been anything but 
ardent, diligent, knowledgeable, and dedicated (Olowo 1999: 44; The Economist 1996: 46). 
Studies show that most post  independence  Nigerian leaders lacked strategic vision, avoided 
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taking necessary risks to implement fundamental reforms, and flipped-flopped on 
implementing of approved reforms. Researchers have identified lack of commitment to 
improve administrative efficiency and effectiveness; failure to curb corruption; incapacity to 
downsize and   improve public service pay; and lack of commitment to decentralize 
administrative functions and powers as specific weaknesses in Nigeria’s political leadership 
system   (Adamolekun & Ayeni 1990: 58;   Nnoli 1980: 120). 
 
A weak governance system constituted another major factor that inhibited civil service 
reform in Nigeria. Breakdown in the system of accountability, transparency, the rule of law, 
and non- participation of civil society in formulation and implementation of government 
policies characterized the problems of governance in Nigeria. 
 
Both internal and external accountability systems necessary to enhance civil servants` 
responsiveness to their administrative superiors and  the general public such as stiff penalties, 
continuous evaluations of work performance, auditing, whistle- blower reward and protection 
programs, public ombudsmen programs, and  citizen surveys have either not been enforced or 
started and abandoned (Olowu, Otobo & Otokoni 1997: 85). Earlier studies indicate that 
previous proposed rules and procedures to strengthen accountability, including auditing 
systems as control mechanisms, were not adequately implemented (Aina 1982: 48; Olowu 
1989: 97; Koehn 1990: 23).   
 
Furthermore, prolonged military rule in Nigeria eroded the rule of law and incapacitated key 
institutions, including the legislature, judiciary, and press, thus weakening the civil service’s 
capacity to monitor, control, and enforce accountability in the public sector. Corruption, 
which had reached epidemic proportions in Nigerian Society, is further linked to lack of 
accountability, transparency, and of the erosion of the rule of law.  
 
Studies on corruption in Nigeria consistently show that the practice is widespread and 
institutionalized (Aina 1982: 24; Olowo 1999: 25; Obidegwu 1996:100). Use of fictitious 
names in the payroll, salary payments to deceased and retired civil servants, payment of 
salaries to civil servants on unpaid study leave, and double payments to certain staff at more 
than one pay locations characterize the pervasiveness of corruption in the civil service. 
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In addition to weakness in the governance structure, corruption flourishes in Nigeria due to 
excessive use of nepotism and patronage; declining wages exacerbated by rising inflation;  
rise in poverty; absence of mission and trust  in the bureaucracy; the government’s failure to 
punish perpetrators severely; weak control mechanisms; ineffective anti-corruption rules; and 
weaknesses in the Nigerian  justice system. Other specific modes and incidence of corruption 
include bureaucratic use of official position for personal gain through acceptance of bribes or 
graft, involvement in fraud and extortion, and payment of kickbacks. 
 
4.3. Key NPM Challenges and Constraints  
 
Civil service programs are generally designed to improve the core function of the civil 
service and to create a workforce of the size and with the incentives, accountability, ethos, 
and skills needed to provide quality public services. The problem of low morale, corruption, 
limited training, inefficiency, and poor compensation constitute the key issues addressed in 
this study, within the context of Nigeria’s civil service reform experience.   
 
As revealed in this study, Nigeria’s post independence civil service reforms suffered many 
dysfunctions. Researchers have identified a myriad of inherent constraints that impeded the 
reform initiatives described above. For instance, Aina (1982: 46) cited dishonesty and 
incompetence within the civil service as major inhibiting factors. Phillips (1991: 56) 
identified inefficiency, mismanagement, disorganization, over-centralization, neglect of 
training, and lack of measurable objectives as persistent administrative weaknesses. Other 
researchers identified corruption, lack of integrity and honesty, and low morale as major 
constraints (Koen 1990: 22; Adamolekun & Ayeni 1990:55). Adamolekun (1986: 55) noted 
the absence of a strong commitment to professional ethical standards in the public sector as a 
major impediment. Olowo (2002: 15) cited prevalence of cronyism in the civil service 
coupled with prolonged military rule as other dysfunctions.      
 
Experts on Nigerian public administration contended that poor compensation of civil servants 
constituted a key impediment not only to civil service reform or performance of Nigeria’s 
civil service but also to national economic growth and development. These problems have 
been difficult to overcome due to numerous other dysfunctional elements that typically help 
authoritarian military leaders in African countries including Nigeria stay in power for 
prolonged periods of time such as ethnic fragmentation, increased political interference, 
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patrimonial recruitment targeted to reward regime loyalists with jobs, fringe benefits, and 
influence, and allocation of budgetary resources to reflect the needs of elites rather than the 
public interest. In short, civil service reforms have been difficult to implement because of 
strong institutional, political, administrative, and attitudinal obstacles.   
 
Although a myriad of factors contributed to the failure of civil service reform in Nigeria, 
researchers have identified lack of financial resources, poor leadership, weak governance, and 
widespread corruption as the most critical constraints. A study by Schiavo Campo, Tommaso 
& Mukherjee (1997: 14) specifically noted lack of resource as the main constraint to genuine 
improvement of civil service systems in Africa.  
 
Previous studies on public–sector reform in Nigeria consistently suggested that a sharp 
decline in oil revenues Nigeria’s main source of revenue (accounting for up to 90 percent) 
during the past three decades, adversely impacted the design, introduction, and 
implementation of previous reforms coupled with a decline in tax collections which failed to 
cope with relative increases in the size of the national civil service. because, successful 
reforms come with high price tags. 
 
Nigeria, like most developing countries could not sustain implementation of desired reforms. 
The impact of  inadequate fiscal resources is manifested by the steady decline of civil servant 
salaries, pensions, and other benefits; deteriorating physical conditions of public  facilities 
including office buildings, machinery, and equipment; and increased incidence of corruption 
in the civil service. While the government took some measures to improve incentives through 
pay increases in the past three decades, the incentives were inadequate especially for 
managerial and professional staff whose support is considered essential for the success of 
reforms. Similarly, other critical finance- related areas of reform such as training, 
recruitment, and retention of technical and professional staff, and continued monitoring and 
evaluation of reforms, suffered due to the inadequacy of financial resources.   
 
The shortage of public sector financial resources is further linked to the other major 
constraints, namely: poor leadership, weak governance, and widespread corruption. Lack of 
able leadership in post-independence Nigeria constituted another major factor that impeded 
previous attempts to reform the civil service. Political leaders play a crucial role in shaping 
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the capacity of government to formulate, implement, and monitor the policies necessary to 
undertake sustainable reforms. 
 
While the success of reforms can be explained by other factors, Ndegwa (1986: 14) 
considered the quality of political leadership the most critical one. A World Bank (1993: 154) 
study supported Ndegwa’s premise and noted that ``almost all successful reform episodes in 
developing economies had one common feature: they have been crafted by dynamic leaders 
who shepherded changes through complicated terrains. 
 
New Public Management is the theory of the most recent paradigm change on how the public 
sector is to be governed. NPM does not replace older frame works but, adds a new approach 
to public sector governance, that is, contractualism. New Public Management is about the 
most visible sign of the rapid change in perspectives upon how government should run the 
public sector. If there is one label that is used to refer to all kinds of public sector reform, 
then it would be “new public management” (Barzelay 2000: 96). Common to all the public 
sector reform efforts is the attempt to employ new governance mechanisms in the public 
sector that go beyond the traditional institutions of governance such as the bureau and the 
public enterprise and that employ or imitate market institutions of governance (Boston 1995: 
88). NPM as managerialism focusing upon contract making and enforcement seems to take 
government once and for all out of the Weberian framework of bureaucracy (Buclaus 1998: 
94). 
 
Does NPM rest upon a credible theory about public governance or is NPM merely a fad or 
fashion? It is argued that NPM is running out of steam and that it will prove to have been 
merely a fashion. Alternatively, it is argued that NPM was in reality never something new 
and that it was merely rhetoric with hidden contradictory practice .It was simply a mixture of 
ideas, which never really hang together. NPM is also seen in some quarters as: simply right-
wing ideology; nothing really new but simply old contracting out; a special manipulative 
discourse; an incoherent mixture of popular ideas; and a mere extension of micro- economic 
theory from the private sector to the public sector. 
 
NPM amounts to a new theory about governance in the public sector. It is more or less 
coherent theory about how government may deliver services. NPM does not describe what 
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goes on in public sector reform, but it recommends a new approach, if government wishes to 
increase efficiency in service delivery. 
 
NPM is highly relevant for the allocative tasks. Yet, allocative reforms made along the lines 
suggested by NPM have clear implications for regulatory reform. Actually, regulatory 
reforms may trigger changes in the modes of allocation of public services. NPM does go 
together with deregulation of both the private and the public sectors. For transaction cost 
reasons, politicians cannot handle all the various forms of contracts that NPM requires. 
Government needs experts who negotiate, settle and executive the myriad of contracts that 
are forthcoming under the new institutional mechanism replacing the traditional tools of 
public administration. 
 
4.3.1. Problems and Solutions 
 
If NPM offers a new tool for managing the public sector, then one should ask if it is 
appropriate in relation to all forms of public services. The public sector consists of very 
different things, the provision of which may call upon the use of alternative governance 
mechanisms. Government may employ bureaucracy, policy networks or contracting regimes 
to provide its citizens with goods, services, rules and money. NPM seems worth trying in 
relation to regulatory boards. 
 
The classical framework models the public sector as essentially different from the private 
sector. The Public sector is basically a set of positions or roles which operate in an optimal 
manner when these are distinguished from the persons that hold or occupy these positions. 
Furthermore, the emphasis upon a clear demarcation between task and person leads to the 
need to place rules at the core of the public sector. It had been argued that NPM may 
accomplish economic objectives such as productivity or effectiveness, but NPM will in 
general have a negative impact upon democracy and its values. The capacity of politicians to 
govern is reduced by the NPM.-this is the basic argument about the political outcome. NPM 
seems to strengthen the power of politicians to direct and change the public sector, but the 
successful implementation of tendering/bidding and contracting out requires reliance upon 
managers, whose positions become very strong. The stakeholders of public services adapt 
fairly quickly to the governance regime, finding out how to increase their capacity to 
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safeguard their interests. Thus, trade unions do not uniformly reject NPM, but look for 
opportunities to prevail under such quasi- market regimes (Buclaus 1998: 98). 
 
NPM puts in place a contracting state, where personnel and other resources are to be 
managed by means of a series of contracts. These contracts will cover not only the 
employment relation but also be used for the clarification of objectives and tasks for service 
delivery. 
 
4.3.2. Downsizing and the Public Sector Labor Market 
 
Downsizing has been a part of the Public Sector reforms in Nigeria in the last couple of years. 
One reason for this is the policy of donor agencies like the World Bank, which allow large 
bureaucracies among countries, who borrow from the Bank (Nunberg & Nellis 1990: 422). 
 
Some of the arguments in support of civil service downsizing are, to reduce fiscal deficits and 
thus free up domestic resources for the private sector (Fry et al 1988: 429); to reduce the 
effect of the superfluous staff on management time and overhead functions. Furthermore, 
Quah (1986: 238) and Prokopenko (1989: 86) added that it is to improve public sector 
productivity, by tying personnel levels to adequate and sustainable support, and to limit the 
role of the state to those tasks that cannot be adequately, willingly or profitably performed by 
the private sector.  
 
However, Downsizing comes with some costs, to the government. This is because; it is 
capital-intensive to pay off the workers that are trimmed out of government’s service. Not too 
long ago in Nigeria, the various state governments were finding it  difficult to pay  severance 
packages of workers, who were affected by the Downsizing exercise they carried out. 
 
The Public Sector reforms pursued in Nigeria, like in most African countries, for the better 
part of the 1990s, belong to two generations (Lienert 1998: 2) the first generation of reforms 
focused on improvements of incentives in the Public Sector by first, reducing the size of the 
Civil Service and then raising remuneration for those remaining in the Service. This also 
included ridding central registries and payrolls of ghost workers. 
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 The second generation reforms focused on the improvement of management systems and 
raising accountability in the Service. There was also need for the creation of non-monetary 
incentives, including promotion, the assignment of more challenging tasks and training. 
Related to training was the general concern that a mismatch existed between the skills 
acquired during earlier regimes and those required by the new tasks of government; to create 
an enabling environment for growth, poverty reduction and private sector development 
(Schiavo 1996: 6; Van & Weder 1997: 88).  
 
According to Salisu (2003: 4), Nigerians have every reason to expect their public service to 
be well attuned to the development needs of the country. This expectation is not out of place, 
given the large pool of human capital, and vast oil wealth of the country. Despite these 
human and material resources, the Nigerian Civil Service has not done too well in recent 
decades. The abundance of oil resources has in retrospect subverted concerns for increased 
efficiency in government, while also expanding the public sector beyond sustainable levels.  
The productivity of the public sector has declined and the effects of industrial policy on 
investment have been distorted. Salisu, concludes that to turn the tide of public sector 
inefficiency and improve productivity, there is the need for the creation of efficiency- based 
incentive schemes linking reward to performance (Salisu 2003: 6). 
 
Table 4: Employment by Gender, in the Federal Civil Service of Nigeria 1988-93 (Salisu 
Mohammed 2001: 5; Quoted in Federal Office of Statistics, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 
1997: 98). 
 
Year   Total ( Number) Male (%) Female (%) 
1988 255,579 87.2 12.8 
1989 270,020 86.9 13.1 
1990 287,278 84.5 15.5 
1991 182,254 75.4 24.6 
1992 191,329 76.0 24.0 
1993 197,202 75.9 24.1 
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4.3.3. Accountability, Transparency and Integrity  
 
Accountability is very vital in the development of all aspects of life in any country. It is also 
very strategic to the growth of the civil service. Failed accountability is at the root of public 
sector dysfunction. Public sector performance is determined to a large extent by the interplay 
between the public and a country’s institutions of accountability. 
 
One mechanism for successful reform is proper accountability, which goes hand in hand with 
ethical behavior. Accountability and good ethics, can modify behavior, and invariably leads 
to the restoration of public confidence in public institutions and officials (Rasheed 1995: 96). 
The questions on accountability in the civil service are, for what and to whom. This is 
because, a high level of accountability of civil servants to the ruling elites, may compromise 
the civil servant’s integrity and autonomy. 
 
Administrative accountability also entails systems of control, internal to the government 
including civil service standards and incentives, ethics codes and administrative reviews. It is 
very essential for the civil service to become more responsive to the public, and this can be 
achieved through means like: user surveys, whistle blower laws, and public opinion polls 
(Denhardt 1993: 88-90). 
 
Transparency promotes openness in governance. When the activities of government are 
carried by ensuring that citizens are aware of the goings on, there is the likelihood of a high 
level of public service delivery from government’s agencies to the citizens. Transparency 
operates through constant reporting, feedback, clear processes and procedures, and the 
conduct and actions of those holding decision making authority. It makes information 
understandable and keeps clear standards accessible to citizens.  
 
Integrity completes the continuum of accountability and transparency. It is related with 
incorruptibility or honesty and requires that holders of public office should not place 
themselves under financial or other obligations to outside individuals or organizations, that 
may influence them in the performance of their official duties (Schacter 2000: 90-92). In 
Nigeria, the considerable lack of exemplary ethical leadership exhibited by politicians and 
senior public officials, have tended to make personal and private interests, take precedence 
over national interests. As a result of this situation, public officials have no sense of 
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accountability and tend to be lukewarm in their attitude. They tend not to exhibit a public 
service ethic.  
 
When leadership is not ethical, it provides encouragement for corruption to occur, and 
insensitivity to the yearnings of the citizens. This in turn, shapes the attitudes and patterns of 
ethical behavior and the level of accountability, transparency and integrity becomes low 
among subordinates. This lack of exemplary leadership has constituted a major obstacle to 
the success of civil service reforms in Nigeria. It has also led to a fragmentation of political 
life, which continues to channel public service loyalty away from the policy process and the 
abstract state back to themselves in a gross display of unaccountability and insensitivity. 
(Brownsberger 1983: 215-220.) 
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5. CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
  
5.1. Characteristics of corruption 
 
Corruption is the utilization of official positions or titles for personal or private gain, either on 
an individual or collective basis, at the expense of the public good, in violation of established 
rules and ethical considerations, and through the direct or indirect participation of one or 
more public officials whether they be politicians or bureaucrats. Corruption may be seen as 
partisanship that challenges statesmanship (Werlin 1994: 547). It is an act(s) undertaken with 
the deliberate intent of deriving or extracting personal and /or private rewards against the 
interests of the state (Dey 1989: 503). Such behaviour may entail theft, embezzlement of 
funds or other appropriation of state property, nepotism and the granting of favours to 
personal acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority to exact monetary benefits or other 
privileges. 
 
Widespread corruption is a symptom that the state is functioning poorly. It is not only a 
failure of ethical leadership but of governance as well. The problem of corruption also lies at 
the intersection of the public and private sectors. It is a two- way street. 
 
The pertinent questions to ask, when analyzing corruption in the civil service in Nigeria are: 
Is corruption more rife in the public sector rather than in the private sector? Is bureaucratic 
corruption greater at the higher or lower levels of government? What are the real causes of 
bureaucratic corruption in Nigeria? 
 
Studies into management of the Nigerian public sector conclude that corruption is more 
prevalent and institutionalized in the public sector. Moreover, there is a relatively higher level 
of efficiency in the private sector. (Balogun 1980: 88.) 
 
Three major reasons for this situation are advanced: First is the widespread socio- economic 
poverty coupled with the pervasiveness and domination of the economic system, by a highly 
centralized government bureaucracy (Margaret Peil 1979: 65). 
 
This ensures that the latter is the major sector of the economy in which wealth and high social 
status may be acquired. A second factor is the lack of identity by a majority of the people 
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(including public servants themselves) with the institution of modern government, the 
tendency being to regard them as of colonial origin and therefore alien. Such alienation leads 
to the erroneous notion that the public service is nobody’s possession. Public sector 
corruption is therefore regarded as right by its beneficiaries (family members, relations and 
friends) although the same people criticize others who receive such unmerited exclusive 
privileges (Zolberg 1960: 160). 
 
 The third reason, closely related to the second, is the absence of a sense of mission, of 
professionalism and the monumental distrust among public servants themselves which 
politicians are quick to see and use to their own advantage in perpetuating gross 
abnormalities in the operation of governmental business. This together with the daily 
evidence of bureaucratic corruption, in turn drives a wedge between these institutions and the 
peoples’ trust in them (Otenberg 1967: 33-36). 
 
With the politicization of the civil service in Nigeria, has come bureaucratic corruption. 
Political corruption has laid down the ground rules for bureaucratic corruption. Bureaucratic 
corruption is the utilization of bureaucratic official positions for private gain. It is the 
corruption by officials in public offices who are not vocationally politicians but who are 
aided and abetted by corrupt politicians and a corrupt political system Bureaucratic 
corruption has been regarded as a particularly viral form of bureau pathology. “Once it enters 
the blood of a public organization, it spreads quickly to all parts. If not diagnosed and treated 
it will eventually destroy public credibility and organizational effectiveness. Even if treated, 
there is no guarantee that it will be eliminated or that all infected areas will be reached. The 
possibilities of stamping it out altogether are remote as long as the machinery responsible for 
eliminating it is also corrupt” (Caiden 1981: 10).  
 
A corrupt bureaucrat regards his office as a business from which he is able to extract extra-
legal income. As a result, the civil servant’s total compensation does not depend on an ethical 
evaluation of his usefulness for the common good but precisely upon the market situation and 
his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public demand curve (Klaveren 1990: 
26). According to Carl Friedrich (1990: 15), corruption entails the activities or behaviour of 
individuals, engaging in arbitrary use of the power given them by the society to perform 
certain public duties but, as a result of the expectation of a personal reward or gain (be it 
monetary or otherwise), undertake actions that reduce the welfare of society or damage the 
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public interest. Bureaucratic corruption provides civil servants with the opportunity to raise 
their compensation above what the law prescribes.  
 
Corruption, according to Khan (1996: 12), is an act which deviates from the formal rules of 
conduct governing the actions of someone in position of public authority because of private- 
regarding motive such as wealth, power or status. Otite (2000: 94), in his view, states that 
“corruption is the perversion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour or moral 
depravity”. He further states that “corruption takes place when at least two parties have 
interacted to change the structure or processes of society or the behavior of functionaries in 
order to produce dishonest, unfaithful or defiled situations”. Corruption can also be described 
as the conscious attempt or deliberate diversion of resources from the satisfaction of the 
general interest to that of selfish (personal or particular) interest. 
 
As so often occurs in the field of science, the more attention a subject receives, the more 
complicated it becomes. Corruption comes in too many forms to permit easy generalization. 
There is high-level and low level corruption, and there is predominantly political and 
predominantly bureaucratic corruption. There are endemic, pervasive forms and isolated, 
infrequent forms. There are mutually re-enforcing networks of complex, indirect and subtle 
transactions; and isolated, simple, direct, and bilateral transactions that have contradictory 
effects. There is large, disruptive corruption and petty, trivial corruption. Corrupt exchanges 
may be rare or frequent, open or closed, between equals or unequal’s; the stakes may be 
tangible or intangible, durable or non- durable, routine or extra ordinary; and the channels 
may be legitimate or illegitimate (Johnston 1986: 459). However, this controversy does not 
invalidate certain universal generalizations: 
 
1. Corruption has been found in all political systems, at every level of government, and 
in the delivery of all scarce public goods and services. 
2. Corruption varies in origin, incidence, and importance among different geographic 
regions, sovereign states, political cultures, economies, and administrative 
arrangements. 
3. Corruption is facilitated by the societal context (including international and 
transnational influences) in which public power is exercised. 
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4. Corruption has multidinous causes, assumes many different patterns and guises and 
cannot be accurately measured because of its often indeterminate and conspiratorial 
nature. 
5. Corruption is deeply rooted, cancerous, contaminating, and impossible to eradicate 
because controls tend to be formalistic, superficial, temporary, and even counter 
productive. 
6. Corruption is directed at real power, key decision points, and discretionary authority. 
It commands a price for both access to decision makers and influence in decision-                                   
making. 
7. Corruption is facilitated by unstable policies, uncertain economies, mal-distributed 
wealth, unrepresentative government, entrepreneurial ambitions, privatization of 
public resources, factionalism, personalism, and dependency. 
8. Corruption favors those who have over those who have not; illegal enterprises, 
underground economies, and organized crime. 
9. Corruption persists substantially as its perpetrators can coerce participation, public 
attitudes towards it vary widely, and it greatly benefits a privileged few at the expense 
of the disadvantaged masses, or benefits all participants at the cost of non participants. 
10. Corruption can be contained within acceptable limits through political will, 
democratic, fragmented countervailing power, legal- rational administrative norms, 
inculcation of personal honesty and integrity, and effective  enforcement of public 
ethics- although its complete elimination is still beyond human capability (Johnston 
1986: 459-470). 
 
Bureaucratic corruption takes place in transactions between private individuals or firms and 
public officials. Thus, it is the misuse of public funds and the failure of public trust that is of 
particular concern.  Such corruption seriously undermines the effectiveness of government. 
However, bureaucratic corruption continue to be institutionally supported, accepted and 
socially tolerated to such an extent that nobody considers that anything needs to be done 
about them, except in those rare circumstances where clearly they have gotten out of hand 
and alienated substantial numbers of people to the point of anger and rebellion Over time, 
corruption corrodes popular confidence in public institutions thus making it harder to raise 
the standards of public service.  In Nigeria, the daily evidence of bureaucratic corruption has 
driven a wedge between public institutions and the people’s trust in them.  
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Bureaucratic corruption thrives in Nigeria for a number of reasons and five primary factors 
that contribute to it, and perhaps even protect it, can be identified. First is the general absence 
of a civil service work ethic. Many civil servants in Nigeria lack a sense of purpose and 
commitment to their responsibilities.  They do not believe that they are serving any one else 
but themselves and exploit their positions for personal gain. They generally arrive at work 
late and leave early. They take extra long lunch recesses. They steal public property. They 
accept bribes for the performance of duties that are contractually part of their responsibilities. 
They stymie the public by losing files; through excessive review of the issue at hand, or by 
simply pretending that they have not heard of the matter before. For all these, they 
acknowledge no wrong doing, for they do not believe that what they are doing is wrong 
(Gboyega Alex 1996: 98). Secondly, Nigeria like many other developing countries has for 
some time been experiencing economic depression. This, in turn, has led to a bi-polar type of 
income distribution creating the “haves” and the “have-not”. Civil servants striving for high 
social status and want to be counted among the “haves” must resort to the instrument of 
“demonstration effect” - a demonstration effect that entails conspicuous consumption of 
luxury goods that they cannot afford from their salaries. It is, therefore, with great amusement 
and much alarm that the public view civil servants driving through their respective capital 
cities in large, expensive, specially imported automobiles (Olugbemi 1979: 109). 
 
The incentive to corrupt whatever official purposes public institutions are agreed to have, is 
specifically great in conditions of extreme inequality and absolute poverty (Leys 1965: 90). 
Poverty and inequality force individuals not only to tolerate corruption, but also to initiate it 
where none exists, and to take advantage of where it is present. Favors are sometimes 
extended   to other individuals because of the desire to alleviate their poverty. At other times, 
such favors may be extended with the objective of extracting future benefits from the 
recipients.  Thirdly, is the lack of leadership and discipline shown by politicians? 
 
Bureaucratic corruption tends to be more widespread where significant political corruption 
exists and /or where the idea of the national interest remains weak (Colin Leys 1965: 92). 
Herein lies the concept of ``soft state``. Myrdal has argued that a soft state is one where all 
the various types of social indiscipline manifests themselves in the form of deficiencies in 
legislation and in the observance and enforcement of law. Moreover, there is widespread 
disobedience by public officials, on various levels, to rules and directives and much collusion 
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with powerful individuals and groups whose conduct they should regulate (Gunnar 1970: 
208). Such softness is related to corruption.  
 
The state is often an artificial entity. The disregard of its rules bears little social stigma and 
rules are largely disregarded where the political overseers exhibit weak leadership.  The 
fourth factor contributing to bureaucratic corruption is the expanding role of state activity 
which in turn has resulted in an expanding bureaucracy with increasing discretionary power 
which, is abused for personal gain. 
 
The fifth factor has to do with cultural norms. Jabbra (1976: 18) has argued that “bureaucratic 
corruption is created by attitudes and patterns of behavior interwoven not only throughout the 
bureaucratic structures in Nigeria, but also throughout the whole of the social fabric.” That is 
to say, bureaucratic corruption is shaped and conditioned by cultural attitudes and behavioral 
patterns that are defective. Nigerian bureaucrats are faced with a choice of adhering to the 
standards of modern development administration or to the accepted traditional standards. The 
latter is usually chosen. 
 
The meritocratic idea, for example, is neglected in favor of personal or sectional interests. In 
Nigeria, like many countries in Africa, the relationship between the individuals and the group 
the extended family, the clan, the tribe differs sharply from that in the nuclear family- 
dominated west. Despite the rapid expansion in the Nigerian public bureaucracy over the 
years, there is still lack of highly qualified manpower necessary for policy implementation, as 
a result of the emigration of high-level manpower and a general lack of desire by qualified 
professionals to return (Caiden 1977: 303-306).     
 
Bureaucratic Corruption Typology  
  
According to Gould (1980:22), there are about twenty categories of corruption in developing 
countries bureaucracies, as applicable also to Nigerian Public bureaucracy:   
 
A. Corruption in the Routine Course of Government Business. 
1. Bribes paid to have compromising documents removed from files. 
2. Fraudulent use of official stationary. 
3. Payment for office visits. 
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4. Payment for letters of recommendation 
5. Kickbacks for hiring. 
6. Permanent kicks backs (no-fault bribes). 
7. Phony travel documents and official travel-related peccadilloes. 
8. Misuse of official housing. 
9. Two salaries and neglect of public service for outside businesses. 
10. Salary computerization fraud. 
11. Embezzlement (in its many varieties) 
 
B. Corruption in the Exercise of substantive Government Programs 
1. False bills. 
2. Income tax fraud. 
3. Excise tax fraud. 
4. Import tax fraud. 
5. Business auditing fraud. 
6. Export tax fraud. 
7. Tax-Stamp Fraud. 
8. Postal Fraud. 
9. Court tampering. 
10. Military and Policy Shakedown  
 
Further, the point was also clearly expressed by Naomi and Gerald Caiden, who call it 
systemic corruption, i.e.: A situation where wrongdoing has become the norm, and  the 
standard accepted behavior necessary to accomplish organizational goals according to the 
notions of public responsibility and trust has become the  rule, not the exception. In this 
situation, corruption has become so regularized and institutionalized that organizational 
support back wrong doing and actually penalize those who live up to the old norms. (Caiden 
& Caiden 1977: 88.) 
 
The reasons for the persistence of bribery and corruption, can be the result of the poor 
manner, many of the existing laws and regulations are written and their excessive rigidity. 
Nigerian bureaucracy, is dominated by what can be call “Structural Formalism”, a practice 
related to Nigerian pretence for solving problems by passing laws or issuing orders 
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influencing any serious attempts or concerns for its actual implementation (Asiodu, 1979: 73-
74). 
 
In the last three decades for instance, the government has enacted decrees, edicts and laws to 
control import, rent and prices in general. Much of the legislation has failed to achieve the 
results intended. Most of the time, the exact opposite occurs. In government construction and 
purchases, for example, the bureaucrats might refer to the rules and regulations to give 
preference to a contractor without any bid being made. A more common practice among 
many officials is submitting tenders as a token method for fulfilling all the processes 
provided in the General Order, having already made a secret arrangement to give preference 
to a particular bidder. Another method involves government purchasing activities which are 
riddled with kick back devices. In this case, the bureaucrats benefit (Ekhomu 1980:13; Kisubi 
1999: 345).  
  
 5.2. The Patrimonial Disposition of the State and Impact on Public Policy   
 
In Nigeria, the attempts to made at reforming the civil service have had little positive out 
comes. Khan (1988: 345) attests to this, that despite the quantum of management training 
experiences of public servants in Nigeria, there appears to have been some level of decline in 
the aggregate managerial competence of the officers. Some analysts put the blame for this 
situation on the politicians, who have carelessly handled these reforms over the years (Olsen 
1988: 254). Some others opined that the little success in revitalizing the civil service is due 
mainly to “the expansive tendency of the bureaucracy and the misuse of position, both aimed 
to further the patrimonial attitudes of those at the helms of affairs. (Dauda 1990:485.) 
 
This patrimonial tendency have brought about the duplication of functions and roles, people 
in positions of authority and public trust, create offices and agencies for their cronies, even if 
there are other agencies doing or carrying out the same functions. This anomaly, leads to an 
over-bloated public service. Many of such top bureaucrats who are involved in this 
abnormality, are quick to resist all reforms aimed at cut-back management or organizational 
retrenchment. I have witnessed this situation in my growing up in Nigeria. This line of 
reasoning is in tandem with the views of Strouse (1981: 109); Tullock (1987: 55) that the 
number of subordinates in a given agency increases despite the work load, due to the drive by 
public officers to expand their sphere of influence. 
64 
 
Public sector corruption is a symptom of failed governance. Governance is defined as the 
norms, traditions, and institutions by which power and authority in a country are exercised. 
The NPM paradigm points to a more fundamental discordance among the public sector 
mandate, its authorizing environment, and the operational culture and capacity. This 
disagreement contributes to government acting like a runaway train and government officials 
indulging in rent- seeking behaviors, with little opportunity for citizens to constrain 
government behavior. This view point calls for fundamental civil service reforms to create a 
government that is under contract and accountable for results. The NPM argues for 
contractual arrangement in the provision of public services. Such a contractual arrangement 
may encourage competitive service delivery through outsourcing, strengthening the role of 
local government as a purchaser but not necessarily a provider of local services. The NPM 
goals are harmonious with localization, as greater accountability for results reinforces 
government accountability to citizens through voice and exit mechanisms. Conceptually, 
therefore, NPM is expected to reduce opportunities for corruption (Shah 1999: 385-390).  
 
Andrews & Shah (2005: 210) integrate these ideas in a common framework of citizen- 
centred governance. They argued that citizen empowerment holds the key to enhanced 
accountability and reduced opportunities for corruption. Others disagree with such 
conclusions and argue that NPM could lead to higher corruption rather than greater 
accountability, because the tendering for service delivery and separation of purchasers from 
providers may lead to increased rent- seeking behaviors and enhanced possibilities for 
corruption (Batley 1999: 97; Von Maravic 2003: 88). Countries with corrupt bureaucracies 
have inadequate mechanisms for contract enforcement and public safety and weak judicial 
systems. These deficits raise the transaction costs in the economy, increasing the cost of 
private capital as well as the cost of public service provision. The problem is compounded by 
path dependency (the fact that a major break with the past is difficult to achieve, because 
major reforms are likely to be blocked by influential interest groups); cultural and historical 
factors; and attitudes, in which those who  are victimized by corruption feel that attempts to 
deal with corruption will lead to further victimization, with little hope of corrupt actors being 
brought to justice. This considerations lead citizens to the conclusion that any attempt on 
their part to constrain corrupt behaviors will invite strong retaliation from powerful interests. 
So, citizen empowerment (through devolution, bills of rights, and other forms of civic 
engagement) assumes critical importance in combating corruption, because it may have a 
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significant impact on the incentives faced by public officials to be responsive to public 
interest. 
 
5.3. Palliatives for Corruption in the Public Sector   
 
Virtually every political leader or social thinker has offered a prescription, most of which 
have failed, in dealing with it. The measures which have been tried, but have failed (in 
varying degrees) to provide a solution, can be classified in to three broad classes:  
 
A) Campaigns mounted through the Mass Media 
This was particularly popular during the military administration of General Yakubu 
Gowon. It was the time when self-appointed Anti-Corruption Crusaders emerged and 
relied mainly on the News Media to carry out “crusades” against corruption in the public 
service. Such ``wild cats`` crusaders provided the background for the establishment of the 
ill-fated corrupt practices bureau, but are today championed by the media-houses which 
are government owned and are therefore subject to the influence of governmental control 
(Adamolekun 1986: 58.) 
B) Declaration by Political Leaders  
This is very similar to (1) with the exception  here that the anti- corruption crusaders are 
launched by the heads of government and usually enjoy a lot of media coverage, even 
though they count for little in the end. The ready examples are the Jaji Address by 
General Olusegun Obasanjo in 1977, and the Shehu Shagari’s ethical revolution, which 
almost a year after its initial announcement lacked a definition or modus operandi. Such 
anti-corruption programs, however, are usually characterized as “complaints” rather than 
an analysis of the problem and attempt to tackle the specific problem of bureaucratic 
corruption (Adamolekun 1986: 60).   
C) Institutional Approach 
Under this category are all the special institutions so far established in Nigeria for 
containing bureaucratic corruption? Institutions such as the Public Complaints 
Commission the Corrupt Practices Bureau, probe panels and other institutions stipulated 
in the constitution such as the Code of Conduct, and its bureau and tribunal. Other 
devices include the declaration of assets for public officers and their relations on 
assumption of office, and the special emphasis put on training since the 1974 Reform.   
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Two extreme forms of this approach which have been pursued are, the “mass purge” of 
public servants by the Muritala Obasanjo regime in which about 10,000 public officials were 
compulsorily retired or otherwise removed from the Nigerian Public Service in 1975 (Phillips 
1985: 55).   
 
The second is the requirement in the constitution to ensure a representative bureaucracy - one 
that reflects the nation’s Federal Character and the ethnic diversity of a state at the state level. 
The reasoning is that a more representative bureaucracy will ensure fairness and justice in the 
making and execution of governmental decisions (Olowo 1989: 98). 
 
It may not be out of place to say that, the aforementioned devices were not very effective. 
None of these measures has so far worked wonders and may not likely work out in the future, 
because, public officers, who are found to engage in corrupt practices such as embezzlement 
of public funds or serious abuse of office, are only retired and offered higher posts by the 
same or another administration.  
 
The purge of public servants was counter productive in the sense that it turned out to be an 
opportunity for victimization and witch-hunting. The corrupt practices Bureaus were 
abolished in 1979 after they had proved clearly ineffective and inadequate for the task 
(Adamolekun 1986: 69).  
 
One other palliative, which is frequently suggested, but which has not been tried, is one 
which diagnoses corruption as an inevitable consequence of capitalism in a developing 
economy context. It is therefore suggested that nothing short of a social revolution leading to 
a socialist State will exterminate corruption. 
 
The attractions of socialism in poor countries with an inherited capitalist economic frame 
work are understood. In particular, its program of ideological training and emphasis on social 
norms and discipline and the greater decentralization of its politico-administrative machinery 
is a clear contrast to the prevailing level of public morality and bureaucratic elitism in most 
developing countries, like Nigeria (Rondinelli 1981: 13-14).  
 
But such an argument obscures the realities of the socialist system and its internal 
contradictions in a developing country. For instance, China and Tanzania are countries which 
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have been practicing the socialist model, yet neither of them has escaped the specter of 
corruption in their public administration system. Although, there is greater commitment to 
social discipline, this is however, counteracted by the pervasiveness of an inefficient public 
sector (Ekukinam 1980: 25). 
 
5.4. Factors Promoting Corruption in Nigerian Bureaucracy and its Effects   
 
The word corruption means something spoiled: something sound that has been made 
defective, debased, and tainted; it also connotes something that has been pushed off course 
into a worse or inferior form. 
 
Corruption according to Nye (1967: 419) is “behavior which deviates from the formal duties 
of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains”.  This also includes, bribery, nepotism, and misappropriation 
 
Corruption prevents the Public realm from pursuing the general welfare. It leads to 
breakdown in shared concerns and results in factional pursuits of special interests and a 
reliance on coercion over consensus. This indicates a state in which organizational integrity 
collapses amid a race for selfish advantages. 
 
When the vast majority in a country are excluded from public life, like the case in Nigeria, 
and only those in the corridors of power, and their associates amass for themselves the 
collective patrimony, the citizens are tempted to follow suit. What the government does, the 
governed believe they can do also. If the government lies, cheats, and steals, so will the 
people. 
 
Since the civil service is made up of people within the society, the culture of kleptocracy, 
entrepreneurialism at public expense, immoral choices and other acts of corruption, will be 
common place in the public service. With these, public office is now used for partisan 
advantages and selfish interest becomes the rule. Group advancement and self-gratification 
becomes the major motives for public work.  In situations like this, Public officials cannot 
make “reasonably disinterested commitments … that benefit the substantive common 
welfare” (Dobel 1970: 958), and they cannot be trusted to exercise their discretion “with an 
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entire absence of interest motive, with honesty of intention, and with a fair consideration of 
the subject” (Baker 1970: 31). 
 
Internal socialization and peer group pressure ensure that public officials go along with or at 
least keep quiet about deviance. Whistle blowers who reveal internal wrongdoings are 
considered treacherous. So, once corruption exists, it spreads through inaction and ready 
accommodation “abetted by complacency, naivety and lethargy” (Werner1983: 149). It can 
be further compounded by public maladministration, which also prevents effective counter 
action. 
 
Public officials who indulge in corruption gain until they are caught and penalized. For those 
officials, corruption is profitable. They can accumulate power and exercise it with fewer 
restrictions. They can live exceptionally privileged, sheltered lives and perhaps amass huge 
private fortunes. Corrupt officials display contempt for other people, no matter how minor or 
seemingly innocent their corrupt acts.  
 
All forms of bureaucratic corruption are a lie that sacrifices the common good or the public 
interest for something much less. It deviates from the search for the Good Society. Not only 
does it point society in the wrong direction, but it also exhaust the legitimacy of the 
government, supports the wrong kind of public leadership, and set the wrong kind of example 
for future generations. It contaminates societal values. Corruption in the civil service 
undermines political decisions, leads to inefficient use of resources. It benefits the 
unscrupulous at the cost of the law-abiding (Rose 1978: 102). It involves the loss of moral 
authority, weakens the efficiency of government operations, adds to tax payers’ burdens, and 
impacts directly on the poor (Benson et al 1978:55). 
 
Corruption is something every body pays for at huge cost, direct and indirect. It is public 
works developments that people do not want. It is shoddy construction that becomes rapidly 
obsolete and therefore needs to be redone or buildings that threaten public health and safety. 
It is public money used to fund inflated contracts or to replace skimmed revenues (Gardiner 
& Lyman 1978: 25). According to Nossiter (1970: 88), official corruption if not curtailed, 
will eventually result in a “softness of state” which comprises all kinds of social indiscipline, 
which hinders effective government and national development. 
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Corruption in the Nigerian Public Service, had led to the moribund state of many public-
owned companies.  Further, some of the companies are struggling to survive; they can hardly 
meet their overhead costs and are indebted to Banks. 
 
The payment of salaries and other emoluments is very difficult due to bureaucratic 
corruption. Also, projects that are executed with government funds are far more capital- 
intensive than some other projects in the private sector. This situation has led to the incidence 
of abandoned projects, all over the country. It has led to some level of decay of public 
utilities, which had resulted in widespread cynicism, hopelessness and apathy among citizens 
for the public service and the government. Corruption in the public service, has widened the 
gap between the rich and the poor, it has also undermined incentives or the motivation to 
perform. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of Corruption (Rijckeghem & Weder 1997, quoted in Salisu 2001:10). 
 
Wage incentives a) inadequate pay 
b) fringe benefits and other financial 
benefits 
Inefficient Internal control a) inadequate supervision and control 
systems 
b) lack of explicit standard of 
performance for employees and the 
organization 
c) poor recruitment and selection 
methods for personnel 
d) too many rules and procedures 
Statutory penalty rate a) amount of fine, prison sentence 
b) administrative sanctions 
c) prohibition of being ever re-absorbed 
in the public sector 
d) penalty for relatives 
Other Factors a) cultural factors, leadership, ethnicity 
b) bureaucratic elitism of civil servants. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
It is difficult to distinguish among the possible causes and to determine their appropriate 
weights. One view, not written down much but certainly heard in Nigeria, like many other 
developing countries, is that low levels of human capital are responsible for organizational 
failure. (Many private sector organizations in these countries are awful, too.) But why would 
governments be performing less well over time, despite increases in standard measures of 
human capital? 
 
Another view is that aspects of some cultures militate against Weberian bureaucracies- for 
example, hierarchy, kinship and tribal networks, the importance of leisure and celebration, an 
emphasis on consensus, or a preference for equality that cuts against effective incentives. 
 
A third idea is that civil servants work because they identify themselves with their countries 
with revolutionary aims, with the noblesse oblige of government elite. As these aims and 
identifications have broken down in many countries, so has performance. When information 
about government performance is constrained by monopoly restrictions and low capabilities 
for information transmission and processing, then feed back loops to government incentives 
at political and bureaucratic levels will not function well, with negative effects on 
performance. When governments expand their scope and exercise monopoly power and 
discretion over the allocation of goods and services, and when accountability is weak, 
corruption will increase. As incentives collapse, so will, performance (Olowo2002: 90-92).   
 
The argument is that most civil service reforms have adopted inappropriate strategies for such 
situations. International aid has emphasized the supply side of capacity building but 
overlooked demand. It has softened budget constraints, distorted local incentives through 
technical assistance, and not taken sufficient advantage of its ability to help governments 
commit to civil service reforms. (Adamolekun 1985: 88-90.) Lack of enthusiasm to changes 
may be attributed to the reforms colliding with institutional norms and rules. It may be linked 
also to bureaucratic incompetence, deficiencies in bureaucratic controls, conflicts of interests 
between policy makers and bureaucratic agents, or ambiguities in the policy making process. 
Resistance to organizational change may also be explained as ambiguities in cultures. Civil 
service reforms may be hampered, if they threaten established identities of the members of 
the service (Halford & Leonard 1999: 98). NPM reforms are a common response to common 
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pressures - public hostility to government, shrinking budgets, and the imperatives of 
globalization. Proponents of NPM like Hughes; (1998:96) think that a new era in public 
administration evolved with the advent of NPM. The success of reforms, in a developing 
country like Nigeria, should be essentially indigenous, so as to stress the sensitivity to the 
existing conditions in the country. Assumptions dictate that the accomplishments of reforms 
in a given country should have the following pre-conditions:                                                                              
1. The establishment of a nation-wide political system 
2. The establishment of a stable, workable constitutional system 
3. A viable economic system 
4. An enlightened, unified elite capable of guiding orderly change 
5. An electorate sufficiently aware of the nature of administration and its rights and 
responsibilities in relation to its civil servants. 
 
Governments adhering to NPM often institute measures to reduce the size of the public 
service while, at the same time maintain high quality services. Often, this is a difficult 
balance to sustain for both politicians and policy makers. In theory, bureaucratic downsizing 
could reduce taxes and enhance the delivery of services. However, it could prove quite 
difficult to provide more with fewer resources. Though very visible that government 
structures are overly bureaucratic and could be improved with organizational enhancements, 
evaluation of the impacts of such restructuring should be imperative before proceeding with 
change.  
 
Government re organization is an integral component of NPM reform as seen from this study. 
Traditional bureaucratic structures are altered with responsibilities for the provision of certain 
services being delegated to arms length agencies outside the direct command of politicians or 
to private organizations through contractual agreements. Often such hybrid arrangement 
allows for clearer lines of accountability in the eyes of the citizenry; however such initiatives 
are not without their drawbacks. NPM encourages public- private partnerships, advocates for 
constant dialogue amongst government departments, and aims to effectively communicate 
with the citizenry. 
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6.1.   Main observations 
 
The goals of this study, as stated much earlier, are to examine how far the civil service has 
been reformed. It was also out to highlight some of the challenges that had faced it, and to 
contribute to what had been written on the Nigerian civil service, with the aim of making the 
bureaucracy in Nigeria, a role model to others in Africa and beyond. 
 
From the study above, the Nigerian civil service was more or less a creation of the British 
colonialists. Furthermore, before Nigeria gained its independence, the public service operated 
along the whims of British expectations and goals. The system of White-hall- Westminster 
politico- administrative arrangements, which was characterized by ; the idea of a career civil 
service, open recruitment, that was  based on open competition and the determination of 
officers’ progress on the basis of performance and seniority. Put simply, the civil service was 
meant to function on the basis of the merit principle. Also, public corporations were 
constituted outside the ministries and departments; with a view to make them operate with 
some degree of autonomy. The Nigerian public administration system before independence 
was based on the federal structure. 
 
The main components of Nigerian public administration before the end of colonial rule were 
mainly inspired by the British. Based on the fore-going, the public service in Nigeria, could 
no longer meet the expectations of the government and citizens, due largely to the 
unsuitability of the British-foisted system, (White-hall-Westminster) to the peculiarities of 
the Nigerian system. The advent of NPM is seen from this study, as a veritable means of 
correcting the wrongs in the bureaucracy, with a view to transforming the moribund 
bureaucracy. The NPM theory, from this work, is about the use of private- sector and 
business approaches in restructuring bureaucracies. The theory advocates the plugging of 
loopholes in government’s transactions, reduction of wastages, and less public resources, less 
government expenditure and more technological reliance, for improved performance and 
higher productivity in the public service. Despite the shortcomings of the NPM, as 
enumerated briefly in this work, it is quite transparent and more result-oriented. It is an n 
antidote to addressing the weaknesses in the civil service, which had over the years, be 
anything but effective and productive. However, it is observed that there have been 
challenges in embarking on civil service reforms, due to its capital-intensive nature. 
Successful bureaucratic reforms have a high price tag. The Nigerian public organizations 
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could not really be rejuvenated, due to the dip in the economic growth, after years of oil 
boom. The country’s economy plummeted, and its currency, the Naira, undergone several 
devaluations. 
 
It is observed from this study, that culture, is very central to the success of bureaucratic 
reforms. The reforms intended, should take cognizance of society’s sensibilities, the people’s 
mindset, which is largely shaped by their values, which invariably is a part of the overall 
culture of a people. Civil service reforms, as can be deduced from this study, seek to change 
the “status quo” and this process is resisted by some in the public sector, so as to continue 
with the practice of “business as usual”, with its attendants effects on the performance of the 
civil service. The centralized administrative system is also observed to be an impediment to 
the efficiency and effectiveness’ of the civil service in Nigeria, over the years. This situation, 
has led to a high level of imbalance, and only few persons enjoy the benefits of the public 
service. With this, the decline in the civil service, became apparent since the past three 
decades, public service salaries have been affected, so much so, qualified persons that could 
have contributed to the development of the civil service, had moved to the private sector,  in 
order to get better remunerations and higher welfare packages. 
 
The bureaucracy in Nigeria has been impeded by the question of legitimacy and credibility of 
the system from the perspectives of the public. Furthermore, the discordance over the 
meaning of the term reform; the lack of attention to the socio-political and economic 
environment into which the Weberian bureaucracy was infused in the last four decades have 
also hindered the emergence of a world-class civil service. The issue of resistance from top 
civil servants to a change in the way and manner, the affairs of government is carried out is 
another clog in the wheel of progress of successful civil service reforms. The attempts to 
reform Nigerian civil service has also been manifest with the various commissions, which 
have been set up both before independence and after independence. There have been thirteen 
(13) civil service reforms, till date in Nigeria, with each having its strengths and weaknesses. 
Another key feature of this study is the scourge of corruption, which have manifested 
severally in the public service. This trend of endemic corruption is about the most 
contributing factor, to the rot in the civil service and the hindrance to civil service reforms 
implementation. This is attributable to the patrimonial tendency of the leaders over the years 
and the consequent negative effects on the civil service and its successful reforms. There 
have been prescriptions for a drastic reduction in bureaucratic corruption, however, the 
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impact of the supposed way-out, have been minimal. The reasons for bureaucratic corruption 
in Nigeria, is traceable to; inadequate pay, inefficient internal control, cultural factors, 
ethnicity, bureaucratic elitism of civil servants among others. 
 
Table 6: Civil Service Reforms in Nigeria: Before and After Independence 1934-1994 
(Ikejiani 1997: 88, quoted in Mohammed 2001: 3). 
 
Reform Year  
Hunts Commission 1934                    
Harragin Commission 1945                      
Foot Commission 1948                      
Phillip Adebo Commission 1954                      
Gorsuch Commission 1954                       
Mbanefo Commission 1959                      
Morgan Commission 1963                        
Eldwood Commission 1966 
Adebo Commission 1971                           
Udoji  Commission 1972                            
 Dotun Phillip Commission 1985                          
Decree No. 43 1988                              
Ayida Review Panel 1994                              
 
 
This study examined Nigeria’s pre- and post- independence experience with civil service 
reform and revealed that previous reform measures yielded limited results. The study 
identified poor leadership, limited fiscal resources, inadequate compensation, rampant 
corruption, weak governance, lack of measurable objectives, inadequate evaluation, 
mismanagement, inadequate facilities, and excessive government involvement in production 
of goods and services as key factors that impeded previous reform proposals. 
 
To ensure that the civil service becomes a virile and effective partner in governance and 
implementation of policies and programs, the study noted that the government must commit 
itself to creating an enabling reform environment by:  
75 
 
1. Learning from the experience of other countries in Africa that have successfully 
implemented civil service reforms;  
2. Mobilizing adequate financial resources to support future reforms;   
3. Narrowing public- sector pay differentials with private – sector   to improve morale 
within the service;   
4. Establishing training programs which are compatible with modern information 
technological advancement to strengthen financial management and improve overall 
civil servant skills;   
5. Establishing and strengthening institutional accountability and transparency measures 
and enforcing the rule of law 
6. Formulating and implementing a strict code of ethics; and   
7. Seeking technical support, expertise and advice from external sources such as the 
World Bank Group especially in designing and financially assisting the reform 
process.   
 
6.2. Discussion  
 
Based on the observations in this study, public sector employees, according their cultural 
identity, react differently to the process of transformation. This is to a large extent universal. 
Some meet it with skepticism, frustration or active opposition; while others react with passive 
acceptance. Some will be positive about the changes and actively adapt to perceived 
opportunities brought about by the changes. From this study, the theory of the NPM in 
relation to administrative reform in Nigeria has been examined. However, it is pertinent to 
turn our focus to the issue of how really relevant is the NPM reforms in transforming the 
public service in Nigeria, like in many developing countries in the world. Administrative 
reforms, whether NPM or non-NPM reforms has always had a high failure rate, in both 
developed and developing countries (Caiden 1991: 94; Kiggundu 1998: 155). Therefore, one 
cannot really postulate that NPM reforms are unsuitable for developing countries on the basis 
of their unimpressive record of implementation, because the same can also be said for any 
kind of administrative reform. The acid-test of the suitability of NPM is not at the output 
stage of reform (implementation, where most reforms are likely to fail), but at that of 
outcomes (end results of successfully implemented changes). Simply put, if some ways were 
found to surmount the implementation hurdle, and it were possible to ensure that changes are 
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not hindered or kept cosmetic, would NPM –style initiatives yield their expected benefits in a 
developing country like Nigeria? 
 
The lack of expertise and the not-so reliable information system in developing countries, may 
mean that it is not viable to develop complex structures such as internal markets or 
sophisticated performance monitoring systems. Such mechanisms would be unreliable at best, 
unworkable at worst. On the other hand, the civil service in Nigeria, may concentrate on 
establishing more effective mechanisms of central control over functions such as staffing or 
finance, because, this precedes any eventual delegation (Holmes 1992:472-475). The 
tendency to draw generalized, once–and-for-all conclusions about the practicability of NPM 
reforms in Nigeria, like many other developing countries on the premise of nationwide traits 
is somehow out of order. The search for solutions to the problems inherent in the public 
service in Nigeria requires open-mindedness and adaptiveness more than ever before. 
 
It has been unusual for civil service reforms to mention ‘corruption’. Until recently, the 
subject was off-limits. As with many problems that are regretted but not discussed, analysis 
suffered, and it is fair to say that countries and donors have lacked a strategy for reducing 
corruption. Though every country has corruption, the varieties and extent differ. When 
corruption becomes systematic and undermines the rules of the game, it cripples institutional 
performance. 
 
Experience teaches us that broad social changes, as well as specific anti-corruption efforts, 
can make a difference. In the long run, more democracy, a more limited state, and freer 
markets will help. Privatization may also reduce corruption, but it is often a scant 
improvement to reinstall another monopoly that happens to be private. Metaphorically, 
corruption follows a formula: C=M+D-A. By this formula, corruption could arise and even 
increase in level, when there is monopoly, and when a person, or very few persons, are 
saddled with so much authority. The C stands for corruption, which can thrive in a situation 
of Monopoly, and when, discretion is added, which tend to neglect accountability in carrying 
out the duty (ies) of government, corruption become widespread. The first step is assessment.  
What kinds of corruption exist, in which functions and agencies, to what degree, who is 
helped, who is hurt, and what are the conditions that contribute to the corruption? Then come 
the development of a strategy against corruption.  A strategy focuses on corrupt systems, not 
(just) corrupt individuals. Instead of thinking about corruption in terms of an immoral 
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individual breaking the law and violating a trust, one thinks about systems that are more and 
less susceptible to various illicit activities. The third step is implementation. “Tactics here 
demand great sensitivity to the local situation. Nonetheless, rules of thumb do exist” 
(Klitgaard 1991: 55). 
 
The prospects for a successful reform process remain possible but challenging. The 
government’s commitment to increasing salaries; improving training; rightsizing the civil 
service; and implementing a strict code of ethics are prerequisites for the success of future 
reforms. As noted by Akpan (1982: 78), the ultimate success of civil service reform in 
Nigeria and indeed Africa, will hinge upon political willingness to implement such wide- 
ranging policies. 
 
Public sector employees are gradually coming to the realization of the need for a truly grand 
civil service reform. This is arising from the adoption of NPM style–reforms and its 
principles and tools, which is at variance, with what have been obtainable in the Nigerian 
Public Service. The NPM theory attempt to breathe a new lease of life to the almost comatose 
state of the civil service. This is bringing about a “business-mindset” into the public 
administration. From this study on Nigerian bureaucracy, which have been plagued with 
inefficiency, ineffectiveness, several challenges, resistance to change by the leadership in the 
civil service, corruption, ethnicity, bureaucratic bottlenecks, unsuitability of the bureaucracy 
to the prevailing culture, the NPM, is a sure way of correcting ills in the Public Service in 
Nigeria. A transformation of government services towards more market-based and private 
sector models of management form a set of challenges to the public bureaucracy, which had 
been  so accustomed to the old order, that have not enhanced the growth and development of 
the bureaucracy. The tendency not to “rock the boat” as many in the civil service may have, 
which is at variance to the NPM theory, may cause a situation of low enthusiasm in 
embracing the NPM- style reforms. 
 
The resistance to drastic changes can be traceable to reforms clashing with institutional 
norms and rules (Di Maggio & Powell 1991: 94). It can also be linked to bureaucratic 
incompetence, deficiencies in bureaucratic control, and conflicts of interests between policy 
makers and bureaucratic agents, or ambiguities in the policy making process (Baier et al 
1994: 160). Resistance to organizational change may also be explained as ambiguities in 
cultures (Meyerson 1991: 254). NPM theory, with its style of reforms threatens the 
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established identities of the members of the public service. The approaches of NPM, which 
mainly focus on efficiency and the applicability and relevance of managerial techniques when 
brought into public organizations, generate a high level of development in the public 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, Du Gay (1996: 92) asserts that NPM is an identity project, since it 
aims at redefining the workforce. The NPM theory, in modernizing public administration, put 
the accent on markets with a special focus on citizens as customers. 
 
6.3. Recommendation of the study 
 
The difference between the powers of the political administration and the fragile bureaucracy, 
which accentuates problems such as over-politicization of the bureaucracy and the lack of 
bureaucratic accountability, has to be solved by changing the current bureaucracy from a 
caste-like hierarchical structure to a more team- oriented and result- yielding structure. The 
over centralized decision-making process should become a more participative decision 
mechanism, and an impersonal mode of communication should become more interpersonal. 
Also, there is the need to establish a structure of elected political representatives parallel to 
the structure of regular bureaucracy at various levels, and ensuring that bureaucracy is 
committed to the ideological objectives of government, especially when the ideology is 
people-oriented. Further more, the problem(s) of bureaucracy that arise from its disharmony 
with indigenous culture, including its social isolation, indifference, and misunderstanding, 
requires serious rethinking above the existing administrative training that often expands the 
bureaucracy- culture gap further. To this end, it is vital to adopt administrative indigenization 
by critically examining the origins of the existing bureaucratic norms and attitudes, 
evaluating their relevance and implications, and establishing a new set of normative and 
attitudinal standards based on the indigenous cultural context. Administrative norms and 
attitudes that facilitate the revitalization of the civil service should be innovative, 
accommodative and emancipatory. 
 
 If  the civil service reform can be given a different face- challenging civil servants to earn a 
good living if performance targets are reached, and simultaneously cracking down on 
corruption and abuse -  it is plausible that both popular and civil service resistance to reform 
could be reduced.  More over, such positive steps toward good governance may appeal to the 
international agencies’ constituents, who increasingly demand symbolic and practical 
evidence that the agencies are `doing something` about corruption and waste.  
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When it comes to civil service reform, institutional adjustment means going beyond supply- 
side strategies. When incentives break down as they have in Nigeria, like some other 
developing countries, the usual approaches to civil service reform and institutional 
development are likely not to work. It is necessary to go beyond the old capacity- building 
projects, the old supply- side strategies of more staff, more computers, more training, more 
rules and regulations. 
 
They are part of the answer, but they are incomplete. More pragmatic and far- reaching 
strategies against corruption could be: Avoid high-handed tactics; Address unemployment; 
Dispel the “free lunch” myth; Recondition the mindset towards service delivery; Assign 
managerial responsibility for results; Create an enabling environment for synergy between 
political and public service leaders, so as to produce the desired behavioral changes. 
(Snodgrass & Patten 1989: 87; Yaron 1992: 11).  
 
Reforms in the civil service should focus on how to increase these resources. For the purpose 
of this study, there are about five major strategies which appear to be crucial. Further, other 
critical measures that must be addressed to attain sustainable civil service reform include 
eradication of endemic corruption, promotion of high ethical standards, improvement of 
governance, and adaptation to changing technology.  Research  by the  World Bank indicates 
that governments  that enforce strong anti-corruption policies including tough penalties on 
corrupt officials, annual review of public servants` assets,  and reduction of government 
involvement in economic production, have greater success in curbing the effects of  
corruption. Extensive government involvement in economic production handicaps its 
capacity to monitor and control its own activities even if it wishes to do so (Obidegwu 1996: 
105).  
 
Curtailing the government `s role in the ownership and management of Nigerian economic 
production by privatizing unprofitable public enterprises can significantly reduce outright 
theft of public resources. Legislative enactment and enforcement of strong anti- corruption 
measures such as mandatory annual declaration and review of the assets of public servants, 
tighter internal auditing procedures; and stiffer and strictly enforced penalties for illegal, 
unresponsive behaviour can curtail corrupt practices (Koehn 1990: 24).  
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In addition, strengthening the accounting system and integrity of auditing standards can also 
reduce the incidence of corruption. As noted by Klitgaard (1991: 63), when auditing is 
strong, “corruption can be drastically reduced even in what seems to be a hopelessly corrupt 
environment”. Periodic review of public servants` remuneration to ensure adequate 
compensation and reduction of excessive red tape can further curtail the incidence of 
corruption.   
 
Furthermore, enforcement of ethical and accountable behaviour in the civil service is critical 
for curbing corrupt practices and fostering a sustainable civil service reform program.  
Adamolekun&Ayeni (1990: 63) attributed the prevalence of wide spread corruption in 
Nigeria to the absence of a strong commitment to professional ethical standards by the 
country’s leaders. Codes of ethics that enhance the highest standards must, therefore, be 
instituted and also embraced by the top leadership of the government.  
 
Creation of a good system of government characterized by legitimacy of government; respect 
for the rights of citizens; accountability of decision-makers to the public; competence of civil 
servants to formulate policies and deliver service; adherence to the rule of law or fair or 
impartial enforcement of legal frameworks; transparency or openness and free flow of 
information; and direct citizen participation through legitimate institutions, is essential for 
success of reforms.  
 
Leadership support and commitment to good government are  essential and must encompass 
among other things the establishment of ombudsmen committees, protection for whistle 
blowers programs, enactment of freedom of information laws and sunshine laws, and  
requirement of timely reporting, and comprehensive disclosure of all patterns of public 
revenues and expenditures in order to bolster public- sector accountability and transparency 
and make government open to public scrutiny (Adamolekun & Gboyega 1979: 102-106). 
                      
The ‘tournaments’ that reward achievements through promotions to higher rank become 
almost  meaningless as salaries become more compressed (Lazear 1995:99). The idea of 
designing an incentive master plan for every part of the civil service at once is misguided.  
Performance measures are so problematic that we are well-advised to begin with experiments 
and then learn from experience. How might such experiments be designed?  Milgrom & 
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Roberts (1992: 83) derive the optimal degree to which pay should be linked to performance 
(see also Lazear 1995:107; Klitgaard 1991:50). 
   
Performance–based incentives are not a panacea. Sometimes, the environment may be such 
that they will not by themselves lead to improvements.  But it is also true that under the same 
conditions, bureaucracies exhibiting very low pay, weak links between careers and 
performance, and corruption are unlikely to be improved by the usual approaches to civil 
service reform. This suggests that the underlying conditions are what deserve systematic 
attention  
 
Here enter once more the analogy to structural adjustment. Price reforms by themselves will 
not liberalize an economy with thin, monopolistic markets, poor information, poor property 
rights and contract enforcement, and corruption. Under such conditions, the creation of fair 
and efficient markets requires ‘adjusting’ many of these underlying conditions. Reform 
efforts should consider ways to:  
 
1. Strengthen the links between employees` efforts and agency’s value added - for 
example, by defining key tasks, inviting employee participation in the definition of 
objectives, training, and team-based analyses of performance.  
2. Reduce the risk aversion of employees - for example, through experiments that can be 
reversed if they turn out badly, employee self- selection into performance-pay 
programs, and credible commitments backed by international organizations.  
3. Improve performance measures - for example, through systematic client surveys, peer 
reviews, benchmarking, detailed studies of performance samples, ratings by superiors, 
and other techniques. Statistically take into account intervening variables where 
possible 
4. Reduce the costs to employees of additional effort - for example, through training and 
better equipment.  
 
It is unlikely that such reforms can take place simultaneously throughout the entire civil 
service. According to Klitgaard (1991: 51-52),” They should begin in ministries and activities 
with favorable underlying conditions Experiments-working with civil servants and the public 
to design pilot efforts with performance- based incentives that are transparent and evaluated 
after a year or two - have many advantages. Risks are reduced and trust is enhanced. Civil 
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servants together rediscover agency missions, define key tasks, work through alternative 
ways to measure results, and contemplate ways to raise funds to pay for incentives 
(documents cost savings, fees for service, and so forth)”. 
 
One element for effective implementation of a reform program entails the development of 
systems and support structures and the creation of an agency with requisite technical 
competence and capacity to formulate and implement a reform agenda. Establishing strong 
civil service commissions headed by individuals with ministerial rank, which had led to 
success of the civil service reform programs in few African countries. Effective 
implementation of a reform program requires building partnerships and consensus in the civil 
service, and placing strong supporters of the reform initiative in strategic administrative and 
managerial positions. Attitudinal changes in the civil service, political stability, and strong, 
long term support by the leadership, however, remain key conditionalities for successful 
implementation of reform programs in Nigeria. As noted by Goldman (2000:2), “Nigeria’s 
civil service will recover only if the government shows resolve and commitment to reform 
and recognizes the need for change, especially in attitude”. There is the need for a sustainable 
effort in the eradication or the drastic reduction of endemic corruption, promotion of high 
ethical standards, improvement of governance, and adaptation to changing technology 
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